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The 'traditional* law of concessions is regarded 
as that set out in the case of Aramco v. Saudi Arabia.^ 
This has much in common with many Western states' 
domestic laws of contract and may be summed up by the 
doctrine of sanctity of contract or 'pacta sunt servanda' 
as the principle is known in International Law. The 
ratio of the Aramco case is that even a sovereign state 
is not entitled to repudiate or unilaterally alter 
contracts into which it enters in good faith with 
foreign nationals, except under recognised exceptions 
such as nationalisation - and then only on certain 
conditions; further, that such contracts and alleged 
breaches thereof, may be subject to the scrutiny of the 
judicial organs applying International Law.
There are those who contend that this principle 
has been altered since Aramco by subsequent events, 
such as the OPEC revolution, various United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions, and cases where compromises 
have been reached, some or all of which are claimed to 
have brought about changes in the customary international 
law to the effect that states may exercise their 
sovereign rights to gain a greater share of the benefits
4 .
of the exploitation of their natural resources at the 
expense of the foreign investors developing those 
resources.
Undoubtedly many of the early concessions (such
as the one in issue in the Aramco case) resulted in a
disproportionate share of the financial rewards of
natural resource production being won by the foreign
companies rather than the producing states. This was
often due to the collective political power of the
2
multinational oil companies.
There was therefore a strong moral argument that 
some compromise be reached and a fairer deal be given 
to the states involved. Perhaps unfortunately however, 
law is not necessarily dictated by morality. Moreover 
the law deals in principles and will inevitably lead to 
inequitable results in some individual cases, but this 
does not necessarily mean that the law changes, or even 
that it should change, at least until the merit of 
certainty in the law is outweighed by the number or 
the seriousness of the individual cases of injustice 
which it causes. It will be shown that the law did not 
change during the period since Aramco and indeed has 
been affirmed by recent cases.
5.
The U.K. position is then to be examined in the 
light of the present international law which, it is 
argued, is still substantially as laid down in the 
Aramco case. Thus critically studied, it is intended to 
show that the developments in U.K. legislation in 1975 
directed at the oil industry were illegal inasmuch as 
they constituted unilateral amendments to contracts 
with foreign nationals (i.e. the licences conferring 
rights upon many non-U.K. oil companies). It is no 
objection to this conclusion, and no justification of 
the Government's actions that the legality of the legislation 
was not judicially challenged by those affected since 
the companies affected took the view that their best 
interests lay in accepting the inevitable and negotiating 
the least damaging compromise which could be achieved 
in the circumstances.
It is suggested that, even if moral arguments 
justified derogations in some of the earlier instances 
of the exploitation of poor, undeveloped states by 
sophisticated multinational corporations, this could 
hardly be applied to the situation of the United Kingdom 
in the 1970s, particularly considering its substantial 
stake in British Petroleum, one of the "Seven Sisters",
6.
and an oil company with as much experience as any other 
in exploration and production abroad.
Notes
1. (1963) 27 I.L.R. 117.




ATTITUDES OF STATES TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Foreign investment began as a natural progression 
from trading between states when, in certain cases, it 
was more efficient to produce goods elsewhere than at 
the producer organisation's base when this required 
subsequent shipment of the goods. It could take either 
the form of an organisation establishing itself where the 
raw materials were available and then shipping the goods 
to where they were required, or setting up a base where 
the market existed, which would entail no subsequent 
movement of goods.
The former was the position as regards the 
'colonisation* of parts of the world by certain states 
which went prospecting for sources of such commodities 
as sugar, rubber, tobacco, gold or other minerals. The 
latter tended to follow on from this, as the world began 
to consume more of everything, thus creating new markets; 
then organisations realised the potential benefits of 
having a base near these new markets, rather than simply 
exporting their goods to them.
The practice of following markets tends not to be
so controversial as the practice of following supplies
since the organisation's foreign branch can become almost
part of the host state - working in it to supply its
population. Friction is much more likely to occur when
that branch is operating in one state to supply the
needs of another. For centuries there have been disputes
between 'colonies' and the colonising states exploiting
their resources, for example, between 1503 and 1660
the Spanish shipped some 16.8 million kilos of silver
and 181,000 kilos of gold from the area of South America
occupied by the Incas and the Aztecs.^ Whilst one may
argue that this was theft, it was seen then as
exploitation of a colony. On this subject Norman Girvan 
2
says,
"Once established, the consolidation and spread 
of the Industrial Revolution were enormously 
facilitated by the cheap food and raw materials 
secured from the colonies and quasi-colonies".
This practice was widespread while 'colonies' in the old 
sense existed, most notably perhaps in Africa where 
exploitation went as far as slave trading, the ultimate 
exploitation of a state's resources, and at its height
9 .
quite legal.
This process becomes relevant to the present paper 
at the stage when the state being colonised or 'invested 
in' takes a more prominent role than that of a mere 
colony: when it takes a hand in its own economy by 
regulating the economic activities of aliens within its 
territory. The stage at which this occurred in different 
countries is a question of history, but the action calls 
for a degree of autonomy, which is a requirement of 
statehood, not present in a mere colony. Article 1. 
of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 enumerates the 
following attributes:
"The State as a person of international law should
possess the following qualifications:
(a) a permanent population
(b) a defined territory
(c) a Government (to which the population renders
habitual obedience)
(d) a capacity to enter into relations with
other states".
Certainly once a State with a Government comes 
into being, the question of how it will react to foreign 
investment must arise - it must formulate some kind of
10.
policy. One cannot generalise about states' attitudes 
to foreign investment beyond a certain degree, as an 
illustration of which a few examples may be examined.
At one extreme we can see a denial of the principle 
of free private investment and trade, which does not 
attempt to solve the problem of the state-investor 
relationship but denies that any such relationship should 
exist.
On December 15th, 1917 the Supreme Council of 
National Economy (known as Vesenkha) was set up in Russia
3
with power to "confiscate, requisition or sequester". 
Initially nationalisation was "punitive", meaning that 
the motive was to defeat or punish the resistance or 
sabotage of the capitalists; it was not done through 
a central authority, but by workers on the spot. The 
first nationalisation of a whole industry in Russia was 
by decree of May 1918 which affected the sugar industry, 
followed in April by nationalisation of the oil industry.
In 1917 Lenin spoke of "declaring all limited 
companies to be state property".^ In 1919, 80% - 90% 
of large scale industry in Russia had been nationalised.
By decree of 22nd April, 1918 all foreign trade was 
nationalised and all commercial transactions with foreign
11.
States or trading concerns abroad were to be conducted 
exclusively "in the name of the Russian republic by 
organisations specially authorised for the purpose".
At this time there was to be no compensation paid to 
those who had lost through the nationalisations. Thus 
we see a complete denial of the role of the private 
investor, abroad or domestically. The only level 
recognised was the diplomatic one.
The Russian economy collapsed after the Revolution, 
so the Government became desperate for credit, and their 
position became that they were prepared to compensate 
former owners of nationalised property in return for 
long-term credits. It was also hoped that the fulfilment 
of private owners' claims would encourage the re-establish­
ment of the major concessions thereby attracting capital 
and skill to selected branches of industry. This was the 
Russian standpoint at the Anglo-Soviet Conference in 
1924: any kind of compensation was "merely expediency"
in the words of Lenin himself, saying further that the 
right of foreign creditors to compensation would be 
recognised only in return for fresh foreign credits.
Even the Russian Revolutionaries then, were forced 
to recognise the need, and pay the price, of foreign 
investment in practice, although ideologically they
12.
virtually denied its existence. The events of the 
Russian Revolution may be seen as the most extreme means 
to attempt to control not only foreign capital, but 
a whole economy.
The Russian case is interesting and important in
its own right, but will not be discussed here since its
political ideology puts it outwith the scope of the
international legal rules concerning foreign investment
which Soviet legal theory tends to ignore rather than 
5discuss.
It is not possible to give a general statement of 
the way in which states regard investment from abroad 
due to the wide range of approaches to it; however, an 
example may be taken from the Guidelines laid down in 
July 1968 by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries' Conference which perhaps demonstrates the 
typical attitude of states, although the means which 
different states adopt may differ greatly, in the 
regulation of investment:
"taking into account the fact that foreign 
capital, whether public or private, forthcoming 
at the request of the Member Countries can play 
an important role inasmuch as it supplements the
13.
efforts undertaken by them in the exploitation 
of their hydrocarbon resources, provided that 
there is government supervision of the activity 
of foreign capital to ensure that it is used in 
the interest of national development and that 
returns earned by it do not exceed reasonable 
levels ....
From this general policy statement one can detect 
an apparently reluctant recognition on the states' part 
of the need for foreign capital in large ventures, 
together with an endeavour to utilise it in a manner 
which the states can themselves control. On the question 
of initial entry, the question is how much a state has to 
offer as an inducement to entice foreign investment into 
it. Within the seeming acceptance of foreign investment 
as a necessary evil, an individual state's willingness 
or otherwise to accept it tends to be dictated by local 
politics which are not, as such, relevant to the legal 
issues until they are manifested in the form of legal 
controls.
One fairly clear tendency is for less advanced 
states to impose financially non-quantifiable conditions 
on investment. This is partly because many states 
simply do not have the facilities or the expertise to
14.
deal with such large financial structures as the multi­
nationals possess, as was pointed out by Smith and
Wells in their article "Mineral Agreements in Developing 
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Countries" :
"The multinational enterprise brings with it a 
bundle of problems that are usually inadequately 
covered by the legal system of the developing 
country. For example, company pricing among 
affiliated entities in different countries 
creates difficulties for tax and exchange control 
authorities. The income tax laws and exchange 
control regulations in many developing countries
...... simply do not contain the principles and
regulations to handle transactions among 
affiliated companies."
Another reason for this tendency is that these 
countries often want those representatives of the advanced 
world to give material aid to their social development 
by, for example, building roads, railways and schools 
and educating and training their youth, rather than just 
supplying the revenue, by way of taxation, for the state 
to do so itself. This is a way for a developing state 
to acquire modern technology and know-how from its 
investors, which may be much more valuable than pure
15.
cash aid. However, as the host state advances it will 
place more and more emphasis on fiscal measures as 
instanced by the United Kingdom's highly complex system 
of taxation in relation to the North Sea investment.
The U.K. Government may be much concerned with such 
social ailments as unemployment and lack of investment, 
but it wants to solve them itself, using revenues from 
the oil - external sources of money are welcomed by the 
U.K. but not so external advice. Witness the willingness 
to accept the International Monetary Fund's loans and 
the reluctance to accept its economic theories.^
THE ATTITUDE OF THE CORPORATIONS
This paper is concerned with investment of capital
by corporations outwith the state which has predominant
legal control over that enterprise. The legal effect of
this is that the company will have access to remedies of
international law which are not available under a purely
9domestic relationship. For example, had Aramco been 
a Saudi Arabian company with a contract under Saudi 
Arabian law with the Saudi Arabian Government, no question 
of recourse to international law could have arisen.
The company must, in general, persuade an appropriate 
g o vernmentto pursue a claim on its behalf, thus in 
theory raising the debate to an inter-state level.
16.
The major effects of this 'international' 
relationship are arguably non-legal ones: namely, the 
economic importance of capital and skill entering a 
state's economy, and the political significance of one 
state's assets being invested in another. Both of 
these points can work for and against each party. 
Economically the company may fare badly because of 
unduly heavy taxation or even expropriation by the host 
state, or the state may suffer through being tied to a 
badly drafted concession enduring for decades.
Politically the corporation may gain great bargaining 
power through the economic and social importance which 
a large investor may acquire,through the amount which it 
pays to the Treasury in taxation or through the amount 
of local people it employs. Conversely, it is vulnerable 
to the effects of an unstable local political system 
which may turn extremely nationalistic and try to 
eradicate foreign influences, perhaps by nationalisation 
without compensation which may be illegal, but that fact 
will not be of much consolation to a company which is 
losing a great deal of money.
The ways in which these aspects of the relationship 
operate tend to depend mostly upon the relative strengths 
of the corporation and the host state which vary from
17.
one extreme to the other. One may consider, at one end 
of the scale, the frailty of the position of a small 
private investor, caught up in the force of the Russian 
Revolution, virtually powerless to protect his investment, 
or to have much chance of redress against a new 
revolutionary Communist Government.
To illustrate the opposite situation, i.e. the 
potential dominance of the company, a few economic figures 
may be put forward. In 1967 the four largest companies 
were as follows:
Company Headquarters Sales (0m) Assets
General Motors Detroit 20,026 13,273
Standard Oil New York 13,266 15,197
Ford Motor Detroit 10,516 7,967
Royal Dutch/Shell s/Gravenhage 7,377 6,512
Against this, one might contrast three small states
Senegal in 1966 had a Gross National Product (G.N.P.) of
#770m; the Ivory Coast had a G.N.P. of 0880m, and Tonga
had an area of 270 square miles, a population of 77,429,
11total exports of 02.6m and imports of 04.3m.
Not only are these corporations huge financial 
undertakings, but in difficult situations they might
lü.
well expect the backing of such a mighty political 
organisation as the United States Government, This would 
present a formidable adversary to such small states as 
the above.
Thus it can be seen that statehood need not 
guarantee economic sovereignty against such odds. A small 
state would be in an unenviable bargaining position if it 
desires, for example, to increase substantially the taxation 
on a multinational company against the company's ultimate 
sanction of cutting its losses and withdrawing an investment 
which could previously have been the country's largest 
source of income.
This potential for exploitation by both state and 
investor is conducive to creating heated arguments, with 
debaters coming to the defence of one side or the other and 
putting forward examples of unjust expropriations on the one 
hand or capitalist exploitation by the multinationals on 
the other, depending largely on their political inclinations, 
a tendency which should be avoided when studying the legal 
aspects of investment.
As mentioned above, the first reason for foreign 
investment was to exploit resources which happened to be 
available abroad, which naturally entailed companies 
from the more developed states expanding to where there 
were resources untapped by local concerns, the local
ly.
authorities being largely content to benefit, through
12royalties, from someone else doing the work. This 
paper is, however, not a historical study of foreign 
investment, but an examination of multinational investment 
which relates not only to utilising the principle of 
comparative advantage but to supplying foreign markets 
(which one may also have created). In this sense the 
principle of comparative advantage is taken to mean a 
'natural* advantage - an inherent advantage in producing 
in one place rather than another, as opposed to the sole 
advantage being the situation of the market. Thus there 
is a natural comparative advantage in producing Whisky 
in Scotland as opposed to the South of England, since 
Scotland has abundant supplies of exceptionally pure water 
To produce it in England would involve transporting vast 
amounts of water over a large distance to create a small 
amount of good distilled whisky, hence there is a clear 
advantage in producing where the raw material is situated 
and merely transporting the refined product, the bulk of 
which is relatively small, despite the fact that the 
largest market for whisky may be in the South of England.
This is quite distinct from the situation where 
a company, such as Ford, wants to expand to a foreign 
country, such as the United Kingdom, because there is
a market there for the product. There can be little, if 
any, advantage to Ford to produce motor cars in the 
United Kingdom which periodically suffers particularly 
bad industrial relations, and very high rates of taxation 
for corporations, except that it brings the manufacturer 
into the heart of the market. (It is, of course, recognised 
that there are many other factors involved in an investment 
decision, other than the existence of a market - one hardly 
believes, for example, that the size of the market in the 
Channel Islands is the reason for so many companies being 
registered there).
The significance of the attraction of the market, 
as opposed to the basic principle of comparative advantage 
as defined above, is that it has helped create multinational 
investment throughout the world, over and above companies 
merely having investments in foreign resources. As 
markets have been created world-wide, so companies have 
become multinational in expanding into these markets rather 
than merely exporting to them. As a result, investment 
between and among states, especially developed Western 
states, is now extensive, and foreign investment by 
advanced states in underdeveloped nations is no longer the 
predominantly important type of investment by companies 
outwith their own national state. Foreign investment in
the U.K.'s area of the North Sea (£l,000m. capital inflow 
13in 1978 ) provides a good example of the amount of
capital which may be invested by multinational companies 
in a major expansion area of an advanced Western state's 
economy including the capital of some of the world's 
largest corporations, such as Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Texaco, 
Conoco, Phillips and Chevron.
Thus multinational investment has been created 
as much by the existence of markets as by the existence 
of resources. Whatever the reasons for particular invest­
ment decisions, the overriding aim of a company in 
expanding abroad will be to increase profits - a public 
company will not go out of its way to lose money 
deliberately.
As in the case of the host state, one cannot 
generalise about companies' attitudes to foreign states, 
since they vary enormously, depending on such factors as 
the size of the corporation, the product manufactured, 
the amount of the investment, the return on the capital, 
diplomatic relations between the investor's state and 
the host state, even the Chairman's character; the 
factors not only change, but are quite unpredictable. 
Hence it may be suggested that the degree of altruism
Tl,
of the investor may vary, but the profit motive is the 
fundamental element in all investment.
This interface between state and multinational 
investor may become particularly apparent at three stages.
Firstly, when the initial investment is to be made. 
This is becoming a more and more complex area; one only 
has to look at Investment Codes such as the Chilean Code , 
the Andean Code^^ or the Canadian Foreign Investment 
Review Act to realise how many factors an investor has 
to consider before going abroad, as compared to the 
attitude of the British investors in the height of the 
British Empire, heedless of the totally inadequate legal 
systems of the colonies.
17The Aramco Case (discussed below) shows how 
straightforward were the provisions of concession agreements 
until relatively recently, indeed the consequences of this 
broad grant of extensive rights to a foreign investor, 
fully elucidated by the arbitration, were indicative of the 
changes which were inevitably to follow if multinational 
enterprises were not to take over economic control of 
small states.
Secondly, during the company's operations, when 
most state-investor conflicts will be financial, as the
23.
operation of the initial agreement tends to work to the 
benefit of one party to the alleged detriment of the other, 
This may be caused by many factors: an unexpectedly high
or low quality of natural resource, an unexpectedly large 
or small amount of it, rising prices or costs, a rise or 
fall in world demand, etc. It is all these possibilities 
which the initial agreement should seek to cover by 
specific provisions.
Many problems at the second stage may be avoided 
at the time of the initial entry by a well constructed and 
comprehensive agreement allowing for periodic review and 
renegotiation within defined limits, according to 
changing circumstances. The lessons of Aramco seem to 
have been learned, since such broad-termed concessions are 
not generally in use now.
The final stage where conflict is likely to occur 
is when the ongoing relationship ceases, or threatens to 
do so - when "the Crunch" is reached. This may take the 
form of threats of, or actual expropriation by the state, 
or threats of, or actual withdrawal by the investor.
At this stage, there is no legal restraint on the 
company pulling out, or on the state nationalising the 
company's assets, given that certain specific conditions
24.
are met. The question then becomes: who has most to lose
from the rupture of the relationship? The answer to this 
is really a question of politics rather than law. The 
termination of the relationship is in any case outwith 
the scope of this paper since the international contractual 
relationship of investor and host state has terminated 
and there is no longer any foreign investment to control 
or regulate.
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CHAPTER II
THE LAW OF THE CONCESSION
The law of concessions - contracts between states 
and foreign investors, usually for the exploitation of 
natural resources - is the most relevant area of international 
economic law for the oil industry since the major oil 
companies have for a long time found it necessary to extract 
oil from territory outwith their national state, and have 
had to obtain concessions from foreign governments to do so. 
These concessions constitute the legal basis upon which 
most of the world’s oil production depends.
Normally the law of a state contract is the 
municipal law of the contracting state. In this case the 
state may disappoint the investor’s expectations in two 
ways: firstly, by a breach of the contract which is a
breach under the local law, in which case the investor’s 
remedy lies in the domestic courts (should this remedy 
prove ineffective there may be a delictual action under 
international law, but that is a separate question from 
the contractual position under review). Secondly, the 
more problematic method of changing the local law, in 
which case there is no breach according to the proper
27.
law of the contract and of which Dr. F. A. Mann said:
"In this type of case where there is no room for 
the problem at all under customary public inter­
national law, no breach of contract in fact occurs 
and, consequently, the principle of pacta sunt
servanda is not infringed ....  Contracts are
governed by the law determined by the private 
international law of the forum. That law 'not 
merely sustains but, because it sustains, may also 
modify or dissolve the contractual bond.* These 
words of Lord Radcliffe express a principle of 
universal application. It is nowhere doubted, and
has frequently been affirmed ....  that a contract
is subject to its proper law as it exists from 
time to time.
In this article Dr. Mann argues that there cannot be a 
remedy for an alleged breach of such a contract, since 
there is no breach; the only possible remedy being 
founded on a distinct international delict, such as a 
denial of justice of such a delict should incidentally 
have occurred.
This argument, as Professor Jennings points out in
2his article "State Contracts in International Law" rests
28.
on an interpretation of international law which pre­
supposes the primacy of national law, over international
3
law, which today is generally regarded as untenable.
As practical examples, one might look at the Nationality 
Decrees Gase^ as contrasted with the later Nottebohm Case^ 
in which Liechtenstein's domestic law on nationality was 
put under scrutiny of international law, and the latter 
was applied by the court. This example shows how inter­
national law is extending its scope not only horizontally, 
covering new territory, but also vertically downwards into 
the realms of what used to be regarded as matters within 
the 'exclusive jurisdiction' of states. This growth in 
the sphere of international law at the expense of exclusive 
domestic jurisdiction (perhaps most notably in the field 
of human rights law^) diminishes the strength of the 
arguments, such as Mann's, for the primacy of domestic 
systems of law. If international law was subservient 
to the local laws of each state at any given time, there 
could be no such thing as international law; at best 
it would be a voluntary code of conduct between states 
whose recognition of it could change from day to day.
The real question then is only whether or not 
international law actually applies to any particular 
situation or dispute. An international court or tribunal
29.
must first decide whether or not international law 
governs the case in question. If it does not, then it 
is because international law dictates this, and not because 
the state can exclude the application of international law 
by its own legislation. Thus Dr. Mann's view cannot be 
permitted to deny a remedy to a foreign investor whose 
expectations have been disappointed by the local legislation 
of a state in contravention of a concession agreement - 
the local laws are not the end of the matter if, but 
only if, the dispute also falls within the ambit of 
international law.
The foreign investor will have a remedy if he has 
acquired a right which international law recognises 
and which no change of domestic law can legally terminate. 
The existence of the doctrine of "acquired" or "vested" 
rights, Professor Jennings says,^ "is now hardly open to 
question", citing several cases in footnotes as authority.
The authority for this contention to be examined
g
here is the Aramco Case, partly because it concerned 
the oil industry which is looked at in more detail later 
in this paper, and partly because it is generally thought 
of as epitomising the classical view of the traditional 
type of concession agreement, and thus constitutes a 
foundation for a study which, of necessity, involves
30.
tracing developments in a changing area of law.
The facts of the Aramco case were uncontested.
A concession agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia 
and the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) on 29th 
May, 1933 and thereafter ratified by both parties.
Article 1 of this concession read:
" The Government hereby grants to the Company on 
the terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned, and with 
respect to the area defined below the exclusive right, 
for a period of sixty years from the effective date 
hereof, to explore, prospect, drill for, extract, 
treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away 
and export, petroleum, asphalt, naptha, natural greases, 
ozokerite and other hydrocarbons, and the derivations 
of all such products. It is understood, however, that 
such right does not include the exclusive right to 
sell crude or refined products within the area below 
described or within Saudi Arabia."
At this time nobody knew whether or not there was 
oil in Saudi Arabia, and whether or not any oil would 
be in commercial quantities. Not until 1938 was oil 
discovered in commercial quantities but very large 
resources were then found and production reached 
352,239,912 barrels in 1955.
JI.
In 19 50 the Saudi Arabian Government had persuaded 
Aramco to submit to an income tax which, together with 
other payments made by Aramco, secured to the government 
fifty per cent of the Company's net operating income.
Since local sales never exceeded 400,000 barrels a year 
(in total less than one per cent of production), the oil 
revenues relied upon exports which were largely achieved 
through Aramco*s international organisation. In most 
cases the purchaser of the oil sent ships to collect the 
oil from Saudi Arabian ports. For twenty years the 
government and Aramco cooperated to their mutual advantage.
On 20th January 1954 the Saudi Arabian Government
concluded an agreement with Aristotle Onassis, the relevant
articles of which (IV and XV) gave the Saudi Arabian
Maritime Tankers Company Ltd. ("Satco"), a company to be
set up in Saudi Arabia by Mr. Onassis, a right of priority
for the transport of oil for a period of thirty years
9
from the date of signing.
The parties' arguments, briefly, were: The
Government argued that the 1933 concession gave Aramco 
no exclusive right to transport petroleum by sea, since 
this was not specifically stated in the agreement and an 
agreement could not by implication alone, limit a 
sovereign state.
32.
Aramco is in the same position as any other 
inhabitant of Saudi Arabia in that it must comply with 
any restriction adopted by the government in connection 
with its oil legislation. The company has no ownership 
in these products which would immunise it, or its buyers, 
from governmental action.
The government remains sovereign and thus retains 
its competence to control all activities occurring within 
its domain. Therefore the government maintained that it 
could lawfully compel Aramco to ship its oil on Satco 
tankers.
The government emphasised that these contentions 
did not conflict with the meaning of the 1933 concessions 
in any case.
Aramco argued that its Concession Agreement gave 
it an exclusive, absolute and unrestricted right to 
export and transport overseas any oil found in the 
exclusive Concession Area of Saudi Arabia, and that this 
was the very purpose of the concession - for Aramco to 
conduct the entire operation for a legitimate profit. 
Further, this procedure had continued for 17 years with 
the government * s approval.
Aramco concluded that the government was not 
entitled to limit, by a unilateral decision, the company's 
rights by granting another concession. Any attempt to 
compel Aramco to sell its oil on condition that the oil 
be transported on tankships flying the Saudi Arabian 
flag was in breach of the concession and incompatible
with the obligations assumed by the government in exercise
. _ .  ^ 10 of Its sovereignty.
Thus the state argued that the two Agreements did 
not conflict, and that in any case the foreign company 
was bound by Saudi Arabian law - that the State retained 
full sovereignty within its own territory.
The company argued that it had a vested right under 
the terms of the Agreement, which was granted in exercise 
of the government's sovereignty, and could not be 
altered without the company's consent.
Much of the argument concerned whether or not the 
Onassis Agreement conflicted with the 1933 Concession, 
which is a matter of interpretation of the particular 
agreements in question. It was held that the transport 
provisions were in conflict and that the earlier agreement 
must prevail over those of the later.
This would seem the only logical conclusion from 
the language of the two agreements, and the lesson learned 
from this was that agreements must contain more flexible 
provisions than the traditional grant of exclusive powers 
over vast areas of land. Having decided that the two 
agreements in fact conflicted, the question became one 
of principle: had a sovereign state the power unilaterally
to change the terms or the effect of an agreement it had 
entered into with a foreign company?
If the company were domestic, the matter would fall 
under municipal law and be decided domestically by the 
state's normal judicial process. If the agreement were 
between states, it would be a matter of International Law 
and outwith the domestic jurisdiction of either, or 
indeed any other state. So the tribunal looked into the 
sources of law to apply to the relationship between a 
state and a private foreign investor.
The crucial question was the nature of the Aramco 
Concession. If this was contractual then neither party 
could unilaterally resile; if, on the other hand, it 
was seen as merely unilateral regulation of its affairs 
by a sovereign state, then the state could alter that 
regulation at will, without breaching a contract, since 
none existed.
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To decide this question, the Tribunal looked at 
Swiss and German law, in which it said a mining 
concession was "a unilateral act of the state, even 
when it results from an exchange of wills between the
state and the individual  This instrument has the
character of a kind of constitution and must be strictly 
observed by the p a r t i e s . T h u s  the concession was 
regarded in Swiss and German law as a unilateral act 
of the state, but nevertheless it bound both parties 
and further, the Tribunal went on, it was enforceable 
against third parties thus creating even wider rights 
and obligations than a contractual relationship.
Looking to French law, the Tribunal said "In 
conclusion, it may be said that a mining concession in 
French law is an act sui generis which cannot be completely 
assigned to any other category. It is an act which 
partakes of the nature of a unilateral act in that it 
depends on the authorisation of the state, and of that 
of a contract in that it requires an agreement of the
12respective wills of the state and of the concessionaire."
The Tribunal also concluded that Moslem law would 
render the Aramco Concession contractual; this resulted 
from two basic principles: first, that 'men shall be
permitted to make all the transactions they need, unless
36.
these transactions are forbidden by the Book or by the 
Sunna* and second, 'Be faithful to your pledge to God, 
when you enter into a pact.*
The Tribunal concluded from all this that the Aramco
concession was of a contractual nature. The implication
of this was that it could not be altered unilaterally by
either party against the will of the other, so Saudi
Arabia could not succeed in its argument that 'in the
exercise of its territorial sovereignty, the Government
retained its competence to control all activities
13occurring in its domain*
When the Tribunal comes to consider the law 
applicable to this contractual concession, its reasoning 
becomes very difficult to follow. On p.167 it says 
"The Tribunal decides to follow the solutions prevailing
in British and Swiss practice ....  this is the law of
the country with which the contract has the closest
natural and effective connection, unless another law is 
designated by the conclusive conduct of the parties".
If any national law, as opposed to international law, 
could be said to be connected with this concession, it
could only be Saudi Arabia's, since the law of the
company - American - is far more remote, and could in 
any case not be imposed upon another sovereign state.
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The Tribunal then says "Guided by this criterion, the 
Arbitral Tribunal comes to the conclusion that some of 
the effects of the concession agreement cannot be governed 
by the law of Saudi Arabia, both because of objective 
considerations and because of the subsequent conduct 
of the parties."
14
Thenit says The Concession Agreement is thus
the fundamental law of the Parties and the Arbitral 
Tribunal is bound to recognise its particular importance 
owing to the fact that it fills a gap in the legal system 
of Saudi Arabia with regard to the oil industry." This 
means that the law governing the parties' relationship 
is the Concession Agreement itself. This is true of 
the Concession as it is true of every enforceable 
contract between two parties, but a contract is only 
enforceable if it is referrable to a system of law which 
states that this is so and determines how it is to be 
interpreted and applied.
Since the Tribunal has rejected Saudi Arabian 
law in this respect, it must mean that the Concession is 
subject to International Law, at least where Saudi Arabian 
law is silent. This is supported by the statement of 
the Tribunal that "Nothing can prevent a state in the 
exercise of its sovereignty from binding itself
38.
15irrevocably by the provisions of a concession." This 
is clearly derived from the two principles of International 
Law; that entering into international obligations is an 
exercise of sovereignty (Wimbledon Case^^) and pacta 
sunt s ervanda,
The Tribunal then concludes, "Because of the
fundamental similarity [between Saudi Arabian law and
the laws of Western Countries] the Tribunal will be led,
in the case of gaps in the law of Saudi Arabia, of which
the Concession Agreement is a part, to ascertain the
applicable principles by resorting to the world-wide
custom and practice in the oil business and industry;
failing such custom and practice, the Tribunal will be
influenced by the solutions recognised by world case -
17law and doctrine and by pure jurisprudence." It is 
submitted that International Law can apply to some parts 
of a concession, while domestic law applies to others, 
but one system cannot apply to part simply because the 
other did not appear to provide a solution. Either one 
system or the other must apply to each section, and 
within that system a solution must be found; failing 
an answer, the party upon which the burden of proof 
falls loses the point; but one cannot simply turn to 
a different legal system because the one which properly 
applies provides no positive answer.
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"Lastly, the Tribunal holds that public international
law should be applied to the effects of the Concession,
when objective reasons lead it to conclude that certain
matters cannot be governed by any rule of the municipal
law of any state, as is the case in all matters relating
to transport by sea, to the sovereignty of the state on
its territorial waters and to the responsibility of states
18for the violation of its international obligations."
At last the Tribunal decides to apply one system 
of law to certain areas of the agreement. The areas 
referred to cover virtually the whole area of dispute 
and so the Tribunal seems here to be saying, rightly, 
that it will apply public international law to the problem.
This is borne out by the rest of the judgement
which relies for its authority mainly on cases in
international law, such as the five PCIJ and ICJ cases
19quoted in the judgement to interpret the Aramco 
agreement which, if anything, was a candidate for the 
application of Saudi Arabian law.
So, despite the initial confusion as to which 
legal system to apply, the Tribunal in fact adopts public 
international law as it sees it.
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On the interpretation of the Aramco Concession,
the Tribunal concludes, "Considering all the facts, the
Arbitration Tribunal is bound to conclude that the
Parties, by their conduct in the application of the
contract, have recognised that the Agreement granted
Aramco the exclusive right to transport its oil across
the territorial and maritime frontiers of Saudi Arabia"
20
and further, "in its capacity as concessionaire, Aramco 
enjoys vested exclusive rights which have the character 
of acquired or "vested" rights and which cannot be taken 
away from it by the Government by means of a contract 
concluded with a second concessionaire, even if-that 
contract were equal to its own contract from a legal point 
of view. The principle of respect for acquired rights is 
one of the fundamental principles both of public inter­
national law and of the municipal law of most civilised 
states  It (The Tribunal) holds that Aramco is
justified in resisting any infringement of the rights
21
granted to it,"
This final sentence is the ratio of the case, and 
its lasting importance. A concessionary agreement gives 
the investor vested rights according to the (public inter­
national) legal interpretation of the terms of that 
concession. The Tribunal did, however, not hold this out
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as an absolute right. An Arbitral Tribunal's powers only 
extend to answering the specific questions which it is 
asked, and even in doing this the Tribunal avoided making 
any wider statement of principle, saying;
"The Onassis Agreement of 20th January 1954, 
corresponding to 15 Jamad al Awal 1373, is neither a 
law of the state of Saudi Arabia nor a government 
regulation. It is a contract concluded by the 
Government with a third person and it cannot have
any effect as regards Aramco or its offtakers and
. ,.22 buyers.
This may be seen as a restriction to the statement that 
'Aramco is justified in resisting any infringement of the 
rights granted to it.* (Supra)
Strictly speaking then, the Aramco case means 
that a sovereign state cannot unilaterally affect the 
rights of a concessionaire by concluding another contract.
The Aramco Concession was an example of the 
traditional concession which typically granted extensive 
rights over vast areas for long periods of time, payment 
being made to the government of the host state by means 
of royalties. This was acceptable at the time of the 
Aramco Concession since many states were then content
42.
to give an investor sufficient freedom to carry out its 
operations as it wished, in return for a secure revenue 
which was easy to administer.
What the Aramco arbitration emphasised was that 
such a wide grant for such a long period inhibited the 
state unnecessarily to its detriment, financially, since 
royalties alone did not guarantee a fair return, and 
politically since states could gain more than merely 
currency from large-scale investment. The Aramco decision 
reinforced those defects by saying that the parties were 
bound to adhere to the letter of their agreement, and in 
particular that the state could not evade its obligations 
by an act of sovereignty.
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"The provisions and concession agreements vary
widely among countries and industries, often reflecting
the relative bargaining positions of the government and
the investor."^ Differing bargaining power is a fact
of life, domestic and international, and must be accepted
as such since it would make a nonsense of contracts, and
therefore the certainty required for modern life, if
every agreement made by parties of different standing
2
could be set aside on that basis. Extremes of such 
bargaining positions may be seen by contrasting the 
relative naivety of Saudi Arabia three decades ago, with 
the experience of the group of western corporations 
comprising Aramco, as evidenced by the broad grant of 
powers in the Aramco Concession which no mo:dern oil- 
producing state would now contemplate grating to an oil 
company since there is no longer such an imbalance of 
relative strengths.
3
Katz and Brewster cite four main considerations 
which might curb a government's desire to win a better 
bargain when it has decided that its initial concessions 
were unduly generous: (1) fear that it would be so
costly as to cripple the concessionaire's ability to 
compete in his export markets (and thus to earn taxes 
and foreign exchange for the government); (2) fear 
that the concessionaire would shift the scene of its new 
investments; (3) fear that, if the concessionaire limited 
or abandoned its activities, the government would have 
difficulty operating or finding other parties to operate 
the enterprise or exploiting the foreign markets developed 
by the concessionaire; and (4) fear of repercussions of 
the bargaining on relations with other potential investors 
or with the investors' home governments. The outdating 
of these considerations, written in 1968, demonstrates 
the shift of power which has taken place since then.
Taking them in order: (1) Most oil exporting countries
now have sufficient resources to sustain themselves for 
fairly lengthy periods without daily accruing oil revenues 
as evidenced by the number of Arab states investing large 
amounts of their oil revenues in Europe to avoid the 
inflationary effects of allowing so much cash into their 
own economies too quickly; (2) the OPEC cartel has 
ensured that oil companies can no longer set one oil 
producing state against another, as for example, they 
did to cause the downfall of Mossadeq in Iran in 1953,^ 
but OPEC members now stand together to form a united 
opposition to any such ploy by the oil companies.
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" 'We just took a leaf out of our Master's book'. The 
Western nations now found themselves, to their 
bewilderment, confronted with a cartel, not of companies, 
but of sovereign states"^; (3) Considering the profits 
to be made out of oil production due to the present day 
price of crude oil, little difficulty would be encountered 
in finding another company to develop or produce proven 
oil fields. In addition, many oil producing states have 
now gained considerable expertise in production, through 
training programmes etc. and are able to operate their 
own enterprises; (4) Oil is becoming an increasingly 
valuable commodity due to its high price and the growing 
awareness of its finite nature, so it is unlikely that 
many oil importing nations could afford to adopt lofty 
attitudes to oil exporters with whose policies they 
disagreed.
All this is summed up thus: "The negotiations
and discussions ....  which I have used by way of
illustration have all taken place under the umbrella of 
the basic Concession Agreement and are governed in last 
analysis by the spirit in which the Agreement was 
negotiated. Actual textual reference to the Concession 
Agreement is, however, relatively rare. A great deal 
more depends on the working relationships between the
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foreign investors and representatives of the Government at 
all levels."^
Indeed, the vast majority of disputes over concession 
agreements have been settled by direct negotiation between 
the parties, or through negotiations involving the investor's 
government.
This, then, is the background to the study of the 
law regarding concessions - the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the parties, the practical, as opposed to 
the theoretical operation of concessions, the politics of 
the governments directly or indirectly involved, and 
increasingly, the enormous value of oil. Although 
awareness of these non-legal elements is essential to an 
understanding of the realities of foreign investment, they 
must be disregarded in examining the legal framework.
Their only relevance to the legal position lies in the 
changes in the law which they cause. For example, in 
itself, the shift in the balance of power from the majors 
(the seven largest oil companies) to the OPEC Cartel is 
not of significance to this study except as regards the 
manifestations of that shift in the attitudes adopted by 
oil producing states concerning their right to control 
their natural resources, which, it may be argued, brought 
about a change in the customary law.
Starting from the legal position which existed 
after the Aramco case, it is essential now to assess 
whether the law of concessions has changed, in order to 
evaluate the actions of the U.K. Government regarding 
investment in the United Kingdom's oil and gas resources.
The General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1952^ 
on the right to exploit freely natural wealth and resources 
which included the proposition that "the right of peoples 
freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and 
resources is inherent in their sovereignty ...." but went 
no further in expanding this principle. This resolution 
was brief and vague in its terms, and was passed by a 
majority of only twelve votes over the total of votes 
against and abstentions and did not therefore constitute 
sufficient consensus to alter the law in this respect, but 
nevertheless set the tone for subsequent developments.
In 1955 the Third Committee of the General Assembly 
adopted a draft article, as a part of the Human Rights 
Covenants, on the right of self determination, the second 
paragraph of which provided:
"The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources without 
prejudice to any obligations arising out of
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international economic cooperation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. 
In no case may a people be deprived of its own 
means of subsistence."^
9A further General Assembly Resolution in 1958 
established a commission to conduct a full survey of the 
status of the principle of 'permanent sovereignty over 
natural wealth and resources'. The work of this body, 
together with the Economic and Social Council resulted 
in the adoption of probably the most important of the 
United Nations' pronouncements on this subject; the 
General Assembly Resolution of 1962 on Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources.
Various views were expressed by the nations 
involved in the General Assembly debate on the resolution 
as to its legal effect but the general feeling then was 
that it was "intended to express existing law; no claim 
was made that the General Assembly could establish
11"new law" or indeed had any legislative authority."
(France and Japan were the notable dissidents from the
view that the resolution expressed existing international 
12 13
law .) Gess concludes that "the General Assembly 
intended to set forth, within the solemn vehicle of a 
declaration, the basic principles and modalities of the
:)U.
exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
subject to the overriding requirement that both principles 
and modalities of exercise be in conformity with the 
rights and duties of states under existing international 
law, and, further, that the principles set forth reflect 
minimum standards.”
In his brief introductory commentary to the
Resolution, Ian Brownlie states "Resolution 1803 XVII of
the General Assembly of the United Nations provides an
important index, albeit not always very precise, of
the present p o s i t i o n " . A s  Brownlie indicates, most
of Resolution 1803 is so vague and ambivalent that it is
clearly a resolution tailored to gain the support of as
15many different political points of view as possible.
For example, it is difficult to reconcile the Preamble 
which states:
" ..... Considering that any measure in this respect
must be based on the recognition of the inalienable 
right of all States freely to dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources in accordance with 
their national interests and on respect for the 
economic independence of States .... "
with Declaration 8 which begins "Foreign investment 
agreements freely entered into by, or between sovereign
51.
states shall be observed in good faith. "
"Inalienable", according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, means "that cannot be transferred from its 
present ownership or relation". That this contradicts 
Declaration 8 can be demonstrated by reference to the 
Aramco problem.
Article 1 of the Aramco Agreement granted Aramco 
the right for sixty years to "explore, prospect, drill 
for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, 
carry away and export, petroleum" etc. This undoubtedly 
purports to be the transfer to Aramco, for sixty years, 
of the right to dispose of part of Saudi Arabia* s 
natural resources, most importantly, petroleum. If 
Saudi Arabia's right is indeed an inalienable right, 
then it cannot be transferred, and any purported transfer 
of it is void. Yet, Declaration 8 states that "foreign
investment agreements ....  shall be observed in good
faith." Is the agreement to be enforced, as Declaration I 
requires, or is it void, since it purports to alienate 
an inalienable right ?
It is submitted that what is meant by "inalienable 
right" is "sovereignty", and that the granting of 
concessions is an exercise of sovereignty. This is
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consistent with Declaration 8 and the law as stated in 
Aramco, and utilises the argument of the Wimbledon case^^, 
since although sovereignty itself may be inalienable, 
rights flowing from it may be transferred by the state, 
and when transferred contractually, that contract 
becomes binding on both parties equally. If the rights 
themselves were inalienable, foreign investment agreements 
could not exist.
Foreign investment agreements do of course exist, 
and their binding nature is affirmed in Declaration 8.
The clarity of the first section of Declaration 8 is, 
however, detracted from by the remainder of it: "States
and international organisations shall strictly and 
conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and 
nations and their wealth and resources in accordance with 
the charter and the principles set forth in the present 
resolution." Although this requires states and inter­
national organisations (which, it is assumed, refers also 
to multinational corporations) to respect state sovereignty, 
this does not derogate from the duty of states to observe 
their agreements, since respect for sovereignty must be 
'in accordance with' the other principles of the 
Resolution, and is not a principle upon which a state 
may rely in answer to a claim for breach of contract on 
an international level.
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The meaning then, of Resolution 1803, in the 
context of concessions, is that state sovereignty includes 
the sovereign right to decide how to dispose of its 
natural resources, but that foreign investment agreements 
are an exercise of sovereignty, and, assuming they are 
entered into 'freely* (which will depend on the facts 
of each case), are to be observed in good faith.
This differs from the Aramco judgement only in 
respect of emphases. Resolution 1803 is called a resolution 
on 'Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources' and 
stresses the importance of natural resources, and their 
exploitation to the states having sovereignty over them.
This is obviously a less legalistic approach than that 
of the tribunal in the Aramco case. A significant 
distinction, which is potentially a narrowing of the 
application of the Aramco judgement is the phrase "Foreign
investment agreements freely entered into ..... shall be
observed in good faith". Coercion in domestic law will 
generally render a contract void,^^ as it would in 
international law, but a contract not 'freely entered into' 
appears to fall'some way short of one involving 'coercion'.
Hence Resolution 1803 may open the door, in 
Aramco type disputes, for a state to argue that it was 
not acting freely since, for example, it did not know
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all the material facts (the extent of its oil resources, 
the value of oil, its actual profit share, etc.) or that 
it was in such desperate need of foreign exchange that 
it had no choice but to accept the terms offered to it.
The difficulty in determining whether a contract
has been freely entered into where there is inequality
between the parties was raised during the General
Assembly's debate on the resolution^^, but no amendment
to the resolution was made, and indeed the view was
expressed that international law, by which the principles
of the resolution were governed, was based on the
19observance of agreements freely entered into.
Despite this apparently sympathetic attitude to
states trying to develop their natural resources, and
the opening of a possible argument on the basis of a lack
of free choice, short of coercion. Resolution 1803 does
not relax the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda and indeed
Declaration 8 affirms it in its most reasonable and
20acceptable form. In a recent arbitration , the 
arbitrator, Rene Jean Dupuy said of Resolution 1803,
"The result is that a state cannot invoke its sovereignty 
to disregard commitments freely undertaken through the 
exercise of this same sovereignty and cannot, through 
measures belonging to its internal order, make null and
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void the rights of the contracting party which has 
performed its various obligations under the contract."
A further Declaration was made by the General
Assembly in 1966 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
21
Resources. This Resolution took into account "the 
fact that foreign capital, whether public or private, 
forthcoming at the request of the developing countries 
can play an important role inasmuch as it supplements the 
efforts undertaken by them in the exploitation and 
development of their natural resources, provided that 
there is government supervision over the activity of 
foreign capital to ensure that it is used in the interests
of national development ....." and "recognises the right
of all countries, and, in particular of the developing 
countries, to secure and increase their share in the 
administration of enterprises which are fully or partly 
operated by foreign capital and to have a greater share 
in the advantages and profits derived therefrom on an
equitable basis .... " (paragraph 5). It further declares
that the United Nations should undertake a "maximum 
concerted effort" to enable countries to exercise their 
"inalienable right" of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources.
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The terms employed in the resolution are not 
sufficiently clear to amount to anything more than an 
affirmation of the general principle of permanent 
sovereignty and a declaration of the desirability of 
capital importing countries gaining some interest in 
the foreign investors operating within their borders.
The U.S. spokesman, in explaining the United States' 
abstention, made his country's position quite clear:
"National participation in the administration of 
foreign enterprises is desirable in principle and 
is generally desirable in practice. However it 
would be a mistake to state that there is a right 
to secure and increase a share in the administration 
of an enterprise regardless of the practical 
considerations, the contractual obligations and 
the equities of the case. Similarly, it is impossible 
for us to agree that under all circumstances there 
is a right of countries to secure and increase 
their share in the advantages and profits from the 
exploitation of their natural resources when it is 
fully or partly carried out by foreign capital.
[paragraph 5] does not state with sufficient 
clarity the fact that no country can escape the
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obligations arising out of international law and
economic cooperation and out of contractual
arrangements which have been mutually accepted ...
.... This resolution, which is primarily concerned
with the economics of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources does not change applicable
22international law or contracts one iota."
This, it is submitted, is correct since to alter 
such a basic principle of international law as pacta 
sunt servanda would require a great deal more authority 
than such vague declarations as are contained in this 
resolution.
Since these resolutions the United Nations has
tended to avoid the issue of the nature of concession
agreements, presumably on the basis that its introduction
could prevent substantial agreement on other aspects of
foreign investment. For example, in the Charter of
23Economic Rights and Duties of States an amendment to 
Article 2 which stated inter alia:
"Each State has the right ....  (b) to enter freely
into undertakings relating to the import of foreign 
capital which shall be observed in good faith ..."^^
was rejected, and omitted from the final Resolution, thus
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avoiding any reference to the status of such agreements.
No expression of state practice made through the 
United Nations permits any basis for a deviation from 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Although more 
emphasis has been placed upon the permanent sovereignty 
of states over their natural resources, this is quite 
compatible with the observance in good faith of a state's 
obligations under concession agreements which are methods 
of exercise of state sovereignty.
Of the force of these General Assembly resolutions 
the arbitrator in the Texaco v. Libya arbitration (infra) 
said "It is particularly important to note that the 
majority voted for this text [Res. 1803], including 
many States of the Third World, but also several Western 
developed countries with market economies, including the 
most important one, the United States. The principles 
stated in this Resolution were therefore assented to 
by a great many States representing not only all
geographical areas but also all economic systems ....
On the contrary, it appears to this Tribunal that the 
conditions under which Resolutions 3171 (XXVII), 3201 
(S-Vl) and 3281 (XXIX) (Charter of the Economic Rights 
and Duties of States) were notably different" and concludes
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"on the basis of the circumstances of adoption mentioned
above and by expressing an opinio juris communis,
Resolution 1803 (XVII.) seems to the Tribunal to reflect
25the state of customary law existing in this field."
A stronger, if less broad-based, plea for the 
precedence of permanent sovereignty over the obligation 
to observe contractual obligations began in the Middle 
East through the vehicle of the Organisation of Oil 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s.
At the invitation of the Iraqi Government, 
representatives of the large oil-exporting countries of 
Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela convened in 
Baghdad during September 1960 and as a result of their 
deliberations OPEC was f o u n d e d . I t s  objectives are 
to be found in the resolutions passed at that conference:
"That Members can no longer remain indifferent to 
the attitude heretofore adopted by the oil companies 
in effecting price modifications;
That Members shall demand that Oil Companies maintain 
their prices steady and free from all unnecessary 
modifications ....
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That if as a result of the application of any 
unanimous decision of the Conference any sanctions
are employed ....  by any Interested company
against one or more of the Member Countries, no 
other Member shall accept any offer of a beneficial 
treatment, whether in the form of an increase in
exports or an improvement in prices  with the
intention of discouraging the application of the 
unanimous decision reached by the Conference ....
The Conference decides to form a permanent organisation 
called The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, for regular consultation among its Members 
with a view to coordinating and unifying the policies 
o f the Member s ....
The principal aim of the Organisation shall be the
unification of petroleum policies for the Member
Countries and the determination of the best means
for safeguarding the interests of Member Countries
27individually and collectively .... "
The warning was thus sounded by the creation of a 
cartel of producing countries, potentially far more 
powerful than a collection of private companies operating 
collusively. At least to begin with, however, OPEC was
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a defensive mechanism to "maintain" prices and "safeguard" 
its Members' interests.
A shift from this stance occurred with the OPEC
Policy Statement of June 1968 which recommended that
posted and tax-reference prices should be fixed by the
governments and linked to the prices index of manufactured
28goods traded internationally.
The Statement also included the following demands:
"....  (1) that changing circumstances should call
for the revision of existing concession agreements
(2) ..... the Government may acquire a reasonable
participation on the grounds of the principle of
changing circumstances ....  (6) that guarantees of
fiscal stability to operators are to be renegotiated
if for any year just ended the company is found to
have realised "excessively high net earnings after
taxes" and ....  (10) to invoke against the
companies the rule of "the best of current practices"
for such matters as incorporation, labour relations,
29royalties, taxes and property rights.
The terms of this statement, the basis for the 
so-called "OPEC Revolution", are a major departure from 
the traditional principles of the sanctity of contract: 
pacta sunt servanda.
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Many people first heard of OPEC in February 1971 
when an extraordinary meeting of OPEC was convened in 
Teheran and the Members presented a united front to the 
world, to the amazement of the oil companies who clearly 
had not expected such solidarity. At this twenty-second 
Extraordinary Conference, Resolution 131 was passed 
which threatened to impose sanctions, including an embargo, 
on companies which failed to reach agreements with the 
hawkish Libyan and Algerian governments which were demanding 
considerably more advantageous deals. The companies 
acceded and the Teheran Agreement of 14th February 1971 
was signed by OPEC and the oil companies, which gave the 
Gulf States new financial benefits, including a rise in 
the rate of income tax from 50 to 55 per cent, an 
immediate increase of 33 cents per barrel and cancellation 
of all discounts off posted prices,
The Teheran Agreement had a great impact on the
industrialised world, largely because of the resulting
increase in oil prices but, more importantly, has been
regarded with hindsight as the turning point in the
confrontation between the producing states and the 
31companies, with the balance tipping towards the states 
which largely achieved what they wanted, against the 
wishes of the oil companies. The Teheran Agreement was
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stated to be binding for five years and therefore left 
little scope for new demands by the states in the areas 
which it covered, most importantly, pricing. The states 
then turned back to one of their repeated demands: 
participation, and for the next two years this took over 
from the battle for prices. Already in February 19 71,
Algeria, after bitter disputes about prices, had 
nationalised 51 per cent of all French interest in her 
oil and at the end of 1971 Libya announced the nationalisation 
of all B.P's assets.
After the OPEC Conference of January 1972,
negotiations between OPEC Members, led mainly by Sheikh
Zaki Yamani (oil minister of Saudi Arabia - a Harvard
graduate and director of Aramco since 1962) and the oil
companies began in earnest. Yamani wrote "the June war,
with all its psychological repercussions, has made it
absolutely essential for the majors - and not least
Aramco - to follow suit (i.e. to agree to some form of
partnership with the Members of OPEC) if they wish to
continue operating peacefully in the area. Partnership
with the host governments is a must; any delay will be
32paid for by the oil companies concerned." On another
occasion, Yamani said "(participation) will save them
33from nationalisation."
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Additional ammunition was given to the Arabs in 
1970 when the U.S. Department of Commerce produced 
estimates that the net assets of the petroleum industry 
in the Middle East were #1.5 billion, yielding profits 
of 01.2 billion, a return of an investment of 79 per 
cent, compared with, for example, 13.5 per cent average 
from smelting and mining industries in the developing 
countries. This was noted by OPEC.
Although the companies publicly retained their 
attitude that participation was "intolerable", most of 
the companies were inclined slowly to give way to 
participation since they depended heavily on supplies of 
crude oil for their profits and the pronounced shortage 
at this time made security of supply a high priority. 
They also believed Yamani's threats.
The companies signed a "General Agreement" in
Riyadh in December 19 72 under which they would give up
25 per cent of the established concessions, rising to
51 per cent in 1983. In September 1973 the Aramco
35partners also gave in to Yamani's terms ’ thus marking 
the demise of the greatest thorn in the flesh of OPEC.
The achievement of this degree of participation, 
the shortage of oil, and the Arab-Israeli war combined
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in 1973-74 to seal the power of OPEC, largely through the 
doubling of the posted prices, the imposition of an 
embargo of all oil to the U.S.A. and the Netherlands, 
and a severe cutback in production. The oil companies, 
although predominantly American, had no choice by virtue 
of their now much closer relationship with the OPEC States, 
but to act as the agents of the Arabs in enforcing an 
embargo designed openly to change United States foreign 
policy, i.e. end U.S. support for Israel. If the embargo 
did not succeed, Yamani warned that the next step would 
"not just be more of the same", which Frank Jungers, 
President of Aramco, had no doubt meant complete 
nationalisation.
"After the embargo had been lifted by the middle of 
1974, the consuming countries were having to face the
apparently unalterable fact that the world's oil was
37now controlled by a cartel of sovereign states." The 
shift of power had gone as far as most OPEC Members 
wished, since, as Dr. Amouzegar, the Iranian finance 
minister said, "F/hy abolish the oil companies, when
they can find the markets for us and regulate them ?
38We can just sit back and let them do it for us."
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OPEC had succeeded, through forming an effective
cartel to avoid being played one against the other by the
oil companies, in gaining control of the supply of oil,
the price of oil (to some extent through having control
of the supply, as well as by taxation methods), and the
oil itself by participation in both the equity of some
companies, and the ownership of varying percentages of
the oil produced. Indeed, by the end of 1975, by means
either of participation or of partial nationalisation,
all Middle Eastern and North African countries owned 50
39to 100 per cent of their petroleum production.
Although OPEC history contains many "agreements" 
with the oil companies (the Teheran Agreement, the Tripoli 
Agreement, the General Agreement of Riyadh, etc.) the 
truth lies in the negotiations behind the public 
agreements, as evidenced by the stern warnings issued by 
the OPEC representatives about the consequences of 
failure on the part of the oil companies to "agree" to 
the proposals. The dependence of the oil companies on 
supplies of crude oil, indeed the large profits to be 
gained from its production even on much less favourable 
terms than previously, made capitulation the only 
possible course in the face of the alternatives of 
nationalisation, or the cutting off of supplies. The
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revised concessions were therefore no more freely 
entered into by the companies than were the original 
concessions by the states. The oil-producing countries 
collectively used their bargaining power to amend 
unilaterally the concessions.
There may have been sound economic, political 
and even moral justification for revising the terms upon 
which the oil companies operated in the producing states, 
but this did not alter the legal principle of pacta sunt 
servanda which governed the concessions.
Vociferous objections were made by the oil
companies to most of the measures by which the OPEC Members
increased participation and prices, but finally, in most
cases, agreement was reached between the states and the
oil companies on a new basis of operation. The oil
companies' assets were frequently nationalised by
producing countries, sometimes in implement of threats
made in the event of failure to reach "voluntary"
40agreement , so the companies were well aware that it 
was better to accept the state's policy and negotiate 
the most favourable deal which could be achieved in 
the circumstances. Their lack of litigious retaliation 
was a matter of commercial judgement in each instance, 
since it could achieve little benefit to the oil companies
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in the face of a state's determination to carry out its 
policy regardless of the opposition to it.
The absence of more forceful reaction from the 
Western governments was due to several factors: the
political sensitivity of the Middle East, especially for 
the U.S.A. in the mid-seventies with regard to Israel; 
the threat of the imposition of embargos upon any 
importer which went too far, which would be potentially 
disastrous for any industrialised nation; some lack of 
sympathy for the oil companies who had made huge profits - 
often avoiding domestic taxation; and a lack of national 
identity with the now multinational oil corporations.
In any case, the oil companies had a tradition of fighting 
their own battles.
There were strong reasons then, why neither the 
companies nor their home governments on their behalf, 
initiated legal proceedings against the OPEC Members' 
actions, but preferred negotiation and compromise.
It cannot therefore be argued that legal principles were 
changed by the so-called OPEC Revolution, first because 
so few states advocated the principles of the OPEC 
Resolutions and subsequently applied them, and secondly 
because the apparent lack of hostility to this was based 
upon commercial judgement and not acceptance of the
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right of the states involved to act as they did. The 
hands of the states which most strongly disagreed with 
the action of OPEC were tightly bound by their dependence 
upon oil from the Middle East to keep their industries 
and economies running.
That state practice did not change during this 
period of activity of OPEC has recently been confirmed 
by a recent arbitral award, Texaco Overseas Petroleum 
Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 1977.
On 1st September, 19 73 and 11th September, 1974 
Libya promulgated decrees purporting to nationalise all 
rights, interests and property of Texaco and The 
California Asiatic Oil Company in Libya granted to them 
jointly by fourteen Deeds of Concession. The companies 
objected to this action on the basis that it violated 
the terms of the Concessions.
The companies, in accordance with the arbitration 
clauses of the concessions, appointed an arbitrator, 
but Libya failed to do so. Again in accordance with 
the contractual arbitration provisions, the companies 
then asked the President of the International Court of 
Justice to appoint a sole Arbitrator. Libya opposed 
this request, claiming that the dispute was not subject
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to arbitration because the nationalisations were acts 
of sovereignty. After consideration, the President 
appointed a sole Arbitrator who, at each stage in the 
proceedings, invited the submissions of both parties, 
and, in the absence of any further Libyan submissions, 
considered the points raised in the Memorandum submitted 
initially by Libya before it refused to participate in 
the arbitration.^^
Thus the Arbitrator was independently selected in 
terms of the agreement between the parties, and considered 
the arguments raised initially by Libya, although not 
subsequently submitted to the Arbitrator when called for.
The Arbitrator, citing numerous authorities, held
that he was entitled to determine his own jurisdiction^^
and that arbitration clauses survive the cancellation of
the contract containing them,^^ that International Law
45was to be applied to the dispute and that he was 
therefore entitled, and obliged, to decide the case in 
accordance with International Law.
The Arbitrator held that a contract could be 
"internationalised" inter alia by the fact that it "takes 
on a dimension of a new category of agreements between 
states and private persons: economic development agreements. „46
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Several elements characterise these agreements: (1)
particularly broad subject matter, (2) long duration, and
(3) the purpose of cooperation in which the contracting 
party must participate with the State and the magnitude 
of the investments to which it agreed. Further, the 
Arbitrator said, the effect is also to ensure to the 
private contracting party a certain stability which is 
justified by the considerable investments which it makes 
in the country concerned. The investor must in particular 
be protected against legislative uncertainties, that is 
to say the risks of the municipal law of the host country 
being modified, or against any government measures 
which would lead to an abrogation or recission of the
 ^47contract.
This classification will bring almost all concession 
agreements, particularly those relating to oil exploration 
and production, within the category of internationalised 
contracts and hence within the scope of international law.
The defence that the concessions were administrative 
contracts was rejected on the grounds that they had not 
even the three characteristics required by Libyan law, 
let alone International Law, to be such, i.e. (1) to have 
for their objects the management or the exploitation of 
a public service, (2) to have been entered into by an
ri.
administrative authority, and (3) to confer upon that 
administrative authority rights and powers which are not 
usually found in a civil contract, such as the power to 
amend or abrogate unilaterally the contract if the 
public interest so requires, or - to use the terminology 
of French law (the basis of this type of contract) - 
to include provisions "which go beyond the ambit of 
ordinary law" ("clauses exhorbitantes du droit commun").
Although the undoubted authority of states to
49nationalise was recognised by the Arbitrator , he went 
on to say that a state "cannot invoke its sovereignty 
to disregard commitments freely undertaken through the 
exercise of this same sovereignty".^^
The Arbitrator pointed out that the fact that 
various nationalisation measures in disregard of previously 
concluded agreements had been accepted by those affected, 
either private companies or states of which they were 
nationals, could not be interpreted as recognition by 
international practice of such a rule since the amicable 
settlement® which had taken place had been inspired 
basically by considerations of expediency and not 
legality.
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The Arbitrator went on, applying these principles
to the facts of the case, to hold that (1) the Deeds of
Concession were binding upon both parties, (2) the
Libyan Government, by its legislation, had breached its
contractual obligations, (3) the Libyan Government was
legally bound to perform the contracts and give them full
effect, (4) the Libyan Government had five months to
advise the Tribunal of the corrective measures taken
by it, (5) failing compliance by Libya, further
proceedings were reserved, but for the present, expenses
were to be borne by the plaintiffs, and (6) the award
52
be filed with the Registry of the I.C.J.
This decision reaffirms the ratio of the Aramco 
case, and moreover, clearly states that despite certain 
General Assembly Resolutions and any apparent contrary 
practice, nothing has altered the principles established 
by Aramco in the intervening period.
74.
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THE UNITED KINGDOM LAW
INTRODUCTION
Although British nationals and non-British nationals 
may suffer equally through adverse changes in the United 
Kingdom's oil and gas legislation, British citizens have 
no title to complain of such changes on the level of 
international law. Their complaints are purely domestic, 
unless internationalised by the terms of their contractual 
arrangements (which is not the case with oil and gas 
licences), and their only recourse is to the courts of 
the United Kingdom,
Foreign nationals however are entitled to bring 
their complaint onto the international forum, either in 
pursuance of a contractual provision to that effect, or 
by its espousal by their national government.
A great proportion of licensees having an interest 
in the Continental Shelf of the United Kingdom are not 
British companies for this purpose (see North Sea 
Newsletters, published monthly by Wood Gundy), particularly 
the majors, of which only B.P. (and arguably Royal Dutch/
Shell) would be treated as British by an international 
tribunal. Even when applicants for licences were required 
to be citizens of, or incorporated in the United Kingdom, 
they would still have been regarded as foreign nationals 
since a "shell" company incorporated in the United Kingdom 
to comply with this provision would have been owned and 
controlled by its foreign parent, thus rendering it a 
foreign company for the purposes of locus standi under 
international law in the event of a claim being made on 
the basis of the actions of the U.K. Government examined 
in this chapter (Barcelona Traction Case, I.C.J. Rep.
1964, p.7).
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAW
The U.K. Government began to exert control over the
country's oil resources in 1917 following on advice
presented to a committee presided over by the Civil Lord
of the Admiralty to the effect that oil probably existed
in parts of the U.K. A Bill was introduced in 1917
providing that the exclusive right to search and bore
for, and get petroleum lying under U.K. soil, was vested
in the Crown. Although this bill was rejected at the
time, it is interesting that its terms were largely the
same as the present legal provisions regarding oil under
the Continental Shelf in accordance with the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf
/ y .
1 2 
1958 . The final Act passed in 1918 did not deal with the
question of ownership of oil as opposed to the right to
deal with it, perhaps due to the complexity of the problem
of ownership of a fluid substance in its natural state.
Such questions as the property in oil in pools 
lying beneath the land of two or more adjoining proprietors 
extracted through wells drilled on the land of one were 
left unanswered. The Act merely forbad the searching or 
boring for oil otherwise than by persons acting on behalf 
of the Government or holding a licence granted by the 
Minister of Munitions. Little activity occurred after this 
act, indeed only seven licences were issued under it, and 
none of these were to a recognised oil company. Three 
of these licences were still in force by 1934, but 
otherwise the 1918 Act was 'a dead letter*.
In 1934 the Government made a clear exercise of 
the principle of territorial sovereignty by passing the 
Petroleum (Production) Act of that year, vesting in the 
Crown the property in all petroleum situ in the U.K., 
together with an exclusive right of searching and boring 
for it. This showed an awakening on the part of the 
Government to the fact that oil could be a major resource 
and, particularly in wartime, too important for 
exploration and production to be hampered by uncertainties
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over rights of property or rights of access through the 
surface to the potential wealth below.
This may be contrasted with the situation obtaining 
in many American States, for example Texas where "the 
landowner is regarded as having absolute title in
3
severality to oil and gas in place beneath his land" 
including a right to drain the whole resources of a * common 
pool* also lying beneath adjoining land to his own. This 
difference means that the U.K. Government can control not 
only the revenue it earns from oil production, but also 
how much oil is extracted, from where, by whom, and by 
what method, in line with Article 1 of Resolution 1803 
of the U.N. General Assembly^ which provides that:
**The right of peoples and nations to permanent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources 
must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and of the well-being of the people of 
the state concerned."
The Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 remains the 
foundation of the law of the U.K. in this field for two 
reasons: firstly, it states the fundamental principles
of ownership of oil situ, and that power to extract 
it is vested in the Crown. It is inconceivable that 
these principles would be changed by any government of
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the U.K. Secondly, It is an enabling act, and it is 
the regulations made in pursuance of it which tend to be 
changed according to the changing policies of governments, 
and not the Act itself.
Thus in 1934 the legal position of oil under U.K.
soil was made clear: it was owned by the Government, which
could grant licences to other parties to exploit it,
subject to the duty to make payment of royalties to the
Government as mineral proprietor. This was clearly an
Implementation of the legal principle of territorial
sovereignty which was described thus in the Island of
5
Las Palmas Arbitration ; "Sovereignty in the relation 
between states signifies independence. Independence in 
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise 
therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions 
of a state"^. As regards offshore resources however, 
the position was not always quite so clear. The first 
claim by a state to the resources of its continental 
shelf is generally regarded as having been that of the
7United States in 1945 - The Truman Proclamation . In 
this proclamation, the United States claimed 'the natural 
resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental 
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts 
of the United States as appertaining to the United States, 
subject to its jurisdiction and control". The claim was
for such powers as were necessary for the conservation 
and prudent utilisation of resources of the "shelf* around 
the United States* coastline which extended from the 
outer limit of the territorial sea to a depth of 200
g
metres . This claim was founded upon two principles: 
first, the need to exercise jurisdiction over the 
conservation and prudent utilisation of the resources of 
the shelf as a national prolongation of the land.
Whatever the legality of this claim in 1945 it was 
followed by many claims of a similar nature, although 
some states claimed broader rights or larger areas. This 
growth of interest in the continental shelves of the 
oceans gave rise to a report by the International Law 
Commission as a result of which the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva adopted a
9
Convention on the Continental Shelf . Despite the fact 
that no more than one third of the international community 
has ratified the Convention, articles 1 to 3 thereof 
have been held to be the customary international law also, 
and therefore binding on all states^^. Thus each state 
exercises exclusive sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploration and exploitation of its mineral, non-living, 
and living sedentary resources (Art. 2), over (a) the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, 
to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where
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the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources and (b) the seabed
and subsoil of similar marine areas adjacent to the
coasts of islands (Art.l). These rights do not affect
the legal status of the superadjacent water as high seas,
11
nor that of the air space above these waters (Art.3).
This then was the framework of international law
within which the United Kingdom properly enacted the
Continental Shelf Act 1964 which provided inter alia that
"Any rights exercisable by the United Kingdom outside
territorial waters with respect to the sea bed and
subsoil and their natural resources, except so far as they
are exercisable in relation to coal, are hereby vested
12
in Her Majesty" . Sections 2 and 6 of the Petroleum 
(Production) Act 1934 are adopted in relation to offshore 
resources, extending the landward regime of regulations 
and licensing to the Continental Shelf. The main difference 
between landward and offshore resources, which are 
otherwise subject to the same legal framework lies in the 
fact that the Continental Shelf Act 1964, unlike the 
Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, does not vest in the 
Crown the property in the resources, but only "any rights 
exercisable by the United Kingdom".
Such legal rights could only be conferred on the 
United Kingdom by international law; this must refer to 
the sovereign rights contained in the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, i.e. rights "for the purpose of 
exploring (the continental shelf) and exploiting its 
resources" - something short of a right of property. Hence 
the United Kingdom's claim to the mineral resources of 
its Continental Shelf was in accordance with the rights 
conferred upon it by international law.
Thus the ownership of resources situ outside the
territorial sea was not settled by the Continental Shelf
13Act in 1964. On this question, Mr. R. W. Bentham says
"The conclusion to be drawn from this is that, on the 
U.K. Continental Shelf petroleum in its natural state is 
res nullius until, applying, inter alia, the law of capture, 
the licensee reduces the petroleum into possession and 
hence becomes its first legal owner". The question of the 
ownership of offshore oil may be left aside for the moment, 
since it is a matter not dealt with by U.K. legislation.
Of this basic system, Kenneth Dam^^ says "The main 
outlines of the U.K. system for exploitation were 
undoubtedly determined as much by tradition as by logic. 
Exploration and production of petroleum on public lands 
in most countries has traditionally been carried out by
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private companies under licence from government". The 
system would appear to be dictated not so much by tradition 
however, as by necessity. Few, if any, governments have 
the financial or technical resources or could take the 
risks required to explore and exploit even onshore 
petroleum deposits. The undertaking would almost 
inevitably require the resources of a company experienced 
in such operations, at least in the early stages. The 
North Sea serves as a clear example of this point since 
the initial costs were extremely high (B.P. for instance 
borrowed £360 million in 1972 to develop the Forties Field) 
and the technology required, very advanced due to the 
harsh North Sea weather conditions, and the U.K. Government 
had no choice but to allow the oil companies to develop 
the resources. However, having been forced to grant 
licences to private companies the state then tried to gain 
as much control as possible over the whole North Sea 
business, demonstrating that the calling in of the oil 
companies was a necessarily evil, to be remedied as quickly 
as possible. The methods employed by the U.K. Government 
to regain control over the North Sea oil will be discussed 
in detail in a later section of this chapter; suffice it 
to say here that the Government's subsequent measures to 
control its oil indicate that the concessions to the oil 
companies at the earlier stage were not so much a matter
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of maintaining a tradition as a necessity. On this point,
Mr. Varley, the Secretary of State for Energy in 1975 said,
"The establishment of a complete capability under national
control will reduce our dependence on the oil companies.
We value their expertise. They have been pioneers in one
of the most difficult projects ever known, requiring
immense technical skill ....  We want to continue to
attract their expertise and to work in partnership with
it. But no other major producer outside the United
States has thought it wise to be completely dependent on
the oil companies, and all over the world the companies
15have, accepted that."
Of the subsequent change of government policy, a 
critical editorial article in the Oil and Gas Journal^^ 
said "in the first place, the government approach repeats 
a familiar pattern set by other countries who have cut 
themselves a share of oil assets either by seizure, 
nationalisation or participation. Operators were 
welcomed in with their capital and technology to take 
the initial risks. Then, when oil and gas were discovered 
and hefty profits appeared assured, the governments 
moved in."
This should not be construed as meaning that the 
U.K. Government initially gave the oil companies carte
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blanche to extract oil from the North Sea, and then 
repossessed the oil once the bulk of the costly work had 
been done. Indeed the regulations applying to the 
companies working in the North Sea were in operation prior 
to the commencement of major operations there and have 
not been so radically altered by the Government since 
then as to change fundamentally the role of the companies. 
The changes which have occurred, principally in 1975, have 
greatly increased the state's role in the North Sea, but 
not so much by a straightforward proportionate reduction 
in the role of the companies as by an erosion of their 
profits and a narrowing of their rather exclusive powers 
to deal with the oil which is discovered.
To examine the changes brought about in 1975, it 
is necessary to look first at the regime existing prior 
to that date. The basis of the system is that licences 
are granted by the Secretary of State for Energy, as 
ultimate successor to the Board of Trade. Exploration 
licences, giving the right to conduct preliminary surveys 
over large offshore areas, allow oil companies to assess 
the probability of the existence of an oil field in a 
particular location; the companies, and any other 
interested persons, are then publicly invited by the 
Secretary of State to apply for the necessary licence 
(a "production licence") to conduct detailed surveys of.
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and if desired to produce any oil discovered in the area 
covered by the licence. The terms of both these types 
of licence are dictated by model clauses set out in 
regulations laid down from time to time by the Secretary 
of State which are to be incorporated into each such 
licence unless the Secretary of State determines otherwise.
THE PETROLEUM (PRODUCTION) REGULATIONS 1966.
The first regulation of offshore activity was set 
up by the Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and 
Territorial Sea) Regulations 1964,^^ which more or less 
repeated the landward regulations which were little 
changed since their original establishment in 1935. The 
two significant differences between the landward and the 
offshore regulations were first, that whilst production 
licences for landward areas were granted in response to 
individual, unsolicited application, offshore production 
licences were to be granted over specified areas ("blocks") 
in respect of which applications for licences were to be 
invited from time to time, in licensing "rounds".
Secondly, the licences to be granted for offshore 
production were to contain provisions that half of the 
area licensed was to be surrendered after a period of 
6 years, to expedite exploration by encouraging the
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licensees to discover as quickly as possible which parts 
of the block have the greatest potential. This desire 
of the Government for speedy development was also pursued 
by means of a work programme, agreed between the companies 
and the Ministry of Power to be annexed by schedule to 
the licence.
The offshore regulations (with subsequent minor
amendments) were consolidated with the landward ones to
18constitute the Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1966
and these, with minor amendments to the offshore
19 20regulations in 1971 and 1972 formed the legislation 
applicable to offshore petroleum activity until 1975,
The first two rounds of licensing, in 1964 and 1965, were 
carried out under the 1964 Regulations, and the third 
and fourth in 1969 and 1971 respectively, under the 
1966 Regulations, thus all the licences prior to the 
controversial fifth round in 1975 were awarded subject 
to very similar terms and conditions.
We look then to the 1966 Regulations as amended as
being the pre-1975 framework. The 1966 Regulations are 
21
stated to apply to, and the model clauses to be included
in, licences in respect of (a) landward areas and (b)
22seaward areas, as defined in the Regulations, unless 
the Minister of Power sees fit to modify or exclude them
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23in any particular case. The precise dividing lines 
between landward and seaward areas set out in Schedule 1 
of the Regulations have remained unchanged and can now 
be accepted as definitive for the purposes of ascertaining 
whether a landward or a seaward licence is required for 
a particular operation. The Regulations provide for 
four different types of licence^^ and lay down model 
clauses separately in respect of each. The four types 
are: landward production licences, seaward production
licences, exploration licences and methane drainage 
licences.
Licences may be applied for by persons who are
citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and resident
in the United Kingdom or who are bodies corporate
25incorporated in the United Kingdom, This provision 
means that any foreign or multinational company wishing 
to participate in the United Kingdom's oil business 
required to incorporate a company, usually a subsidiary, 
in the U.K. The advantages of this to the U.K. Government 
were twofold: that that part of the company dealing with
oil found in the U.K.'s jurisdiction would be unquestionably 
subject to U.K. taxation; and that the company would be 
subject to general U.K. legal control from the details 
required by law to be included in companies' published 
accounts, to the possibility of expropriation, should
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that be legislated for. By being able to control the 
operators a government should be able to control what 
happens to its oil and be able to guarantee the revenue 
accruing therefrom.
A distinction is made between invited and non­
invited applications for production licences, the latter 
being for landward areas not included in areas specified 
in a Gazette (i.e. London, Edinburgh and Belfast Gazettes) 
notice unless the Minister has published a notice to 
the effect that he is once more prepared to receive non­
invited applications in respect of such an area, and the 
former being for blocks specified in a Gazette notice.
In practice all landward production licences have been 
non-invited and all seaward production licences 'by 
invitation only'.
Applications for exploration licences are, by
implication, non-invited and may be made in respect of
(a) seaward areas and (b) any area between the dividing
27lines contained in Schedule 1 and the low water line.
Thus only areas below the low water line are subject to 
exploration licences, which are non-exclusive licences 
to search for petroleum in the area defined as seaward 
area in Schedule 1 plus any additional area below the 
low water line. There were not created any comparable
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licences for landward areas and since the exclusive right
of "searching and boring for and getting" petroleum in
28strata in Great Britain is vested in the Crown , the 
only way in which one can explore for petroleum in a 
landward area is to obtain a production licence. Thus 
in landward areas one would have to hold a production 
licence to make any kind of exploration of the area 
licensed, whereas the seaward regime is that all holders 
of exploration licences may explore the whole seaward area 
except for such parts as are included in production 
licences granted by the Minister to other licensees.
The remaining form of licence dealt with by the
29Regulations is the methane drainage licence . The
model clauses contained in Schedule 6 reveal that this
confers a right on the licensee "to get natural gas in
the course of operations for making and keeping safe 
30mines" in the relevant area under certain conditions
as to records, accounts, etc. This form of licence is
necessitated by the exclusive rights conferred by the
Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 on the Crown of getting
"petroleum" which includes"natural gas existing in its
31natural condition in strata" . Without such a licence 
the removal of such gas, even for safety reasons, would 
be contrary to the terms of the 1934 Act. This type of 
licence was an expedient required by the wide terms of
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the 1934 Act, in relation to landward mines, has remained 
unaltered since its creation and need not be looked at 
further in this study.
Fees are stipulated in respect of applications for 
32each kind of licence . These fees are not a means of 
payment for the licence but relatively low amounts (from 
£20 - £200) to cover the expense of the administrative 
work involved in handling licence applications and 
possibly also to discourage frivolous applications.
Finally, the Regulations provide that one person may 
apply for, and be awarded, more than one licence.
This, then, is the general framework of the 
licensing system applicable to all four types of licence. 
The substance of the licences is contained in the statutory 
schedule applicable to each particular type of licence.
SEAWARD PRODUCTION LICENCES
Seaward production licences are the most important 
type for the purposes of this study since their development 
was the most contentious from both the legal and the 
financial points of view. It was indeed the potential 
financial rewards of the large deposits discovered in 
the North Sea which prompted reconsideration by the
Government of the legal regime of seaward production
, . . 3 3licensing
^ 4  .
The holder of a seaward production licence under the 
1966 Regulations is granted "exclusive licence and 
liberty during the continuance of this licence and subject 
to the provisions hereof to search and bore for, and get, 
petroleum in the sea bed and subsoil under the seaward 
area comprising an area of square kilometres
more particularly described in Schedule 1 hereto ....
Only one such licence is granted in respect of
each area, so that nobody but the licensee may even search
for petroleum in the area specified in the licence and
exploration licences are specifically stated to exclude
areas thus licensed for production. The licence confers
power to "bore for and get" petroleum; neither this nor
any other part of the licence deals with ownership of
the petroleum extracted, hence the question of property
in offshore oil and gas was not answered by the model
clauses. This is perhaps not surprising since it is
unclear whether or not the Crown has a right of ownership
itself because the Crown's rights rest upon the
Continental Shelf Convention 1958 and the relevant
customary rules of International Law, which, as mentioned
above, do not explicitly confer full ownership. It may
be noted that the terms of the actual grant of seaward 
35
licences are identical to those in the landward 
licences^^ where the Crown, applying the principle of
'1} J .
territorial sovereignty, has title to the resources 
whose production is licensed.
The area licensed will be that awarded to the
licensee in one of the "Licensing Rounds". These "Rounds"
are formally initiated by the Minister publishing a 
37Gazette Notice inviting applications in respect of 
38
'blocks' described and specified in such notice. A 
licence may be awarded covering more than one block.
39The licence is granted for a period of six years,
subject to determination by the licensee on giving six
months' n o t i c e . O n  giving to the Minister notice at
least three months before the expiry of the six year
period, the licensee may apply for the licence to be
continued for a further forty years in respect of not
more than half the area originally comprised in the 
41
licence. Providing the licensee has performed the
obligations contained in the licence and providing the 
surrendered area meets the requirements of clause 7(1) 
the continuation will occur. This is to encourage 
licensees to undertake speedy exploration of their areas, 
to determine which half (if either) should be retained 
for further exploration and/or development.
9b .
The consideration for the licences is the royalty 
or other payment specified in schedule 2 of the licence^^. 
Thus, the consideration is in theory agreed individually 
in each licence for the initial period of six years and 
for the subsequent forty where relevant. So every licence 
is governed solely by its own terms in respect of the 
consideration due therefor.
The licensee is required to measure or weigh all
petroleum won and saved from the licensed area by methods
customarily used in good oilfield practice, and the
Minister has power to test and examine appliances used
43
for this purpose. The licensee is also bound to keep
accounts of the quantity of petroleum, in the form of
gas or otherwise, won and saved, of the names and addresses
of persons supplied with petroleum and the details of the
consideration passing and of such other particulars as
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the Minister directs , abstracts of such accounts to be
delivered to the Minister half-yearly^^. A "statement
of value" must be submitted by the licensee to the Minister
half-yearly stating the value of all quantities of
petroleum won and saved in the licensed area during that 
46period. There are specific requirements as to how
47the value is to be computed. These provisions as to
weighing, measuring and accounting should allow the 
Minister to ensure that the Government receives the
y / .
revenue proportionate to the amount of petroleum actually 
won and saved in the North Sea.
One of the briefest, but most important clauses is
Clause 12, which provides that the licensee carry out
with due diligence the programme set out in Schedule 3
to the licence. The negotiation and agreement of this
scheme is a fundamental part of the licensing system
since the licensee companies must, in the Government's
view, be working in the national interest, which involves
exploiting the resources of the North Sea as fully and
efficiently as possible. The optimum rate of extraction
may vary according to economic circumstances (as is
evidenced by developments in the second half of the 1970s
in the Middle East) or political considerations (such as
the Arabs' attitudes to Israel or some Scottish Nationalists'
views on 'Scotland's Oil') but as a rule a state will
want exploration done speedily, at least to find out
what resources it has, if not to go ahead and exploit
48
them as quickly as possible. The programme agreed with
each licensee can be adapted to the circumstances of that 
licence award, taking into account the operator's 
resources, other North Sea commitments, the licensed 
area and so on, so that the precise working obligations 
are very much a matter of individual negotiation and
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agreement, i.e. contractual, in contrast to the rather 
standard form of many of the model clauses. The working 
obligations represent the most direct control which the 
Government has over the manner in which oil is exploited, 
since they allow it to dictate what work must be done 
in a specified time as if to a sub-contractor, in a normal, 
domestic contract.
The consent of the Minister is required before the
licensee may commence, or after abandoning, recommence, or
49abandon any well. The licensee must use methods
customarily used in good oilfield practice for confining
petroleum obtained^^, to control the flow and to prevent
the escape or waste of petroleum, to conserve the licensed
area for productive operations, etc.^^ The licensee
shall not interfere unjustifiably with navigation or 
52
fishing and shall comply with instructions from time
to time given by the Minister for securing the safety,
53
health and welfare of employees in the licensed area 
These provisions are largely regulatory - to secure the 
efficient and safe development of the North Sea and to 
ensure that the least possible disturbance to marine 
life occurs. The Minister's influence is seen clearly 
in the detailed provisions of these articles in that 
his consent will often be required by a licensee in the 
course of developing and producing an oil field, and in
99.
his powers to give instructions with which the licensee 
must comply. It is this capacity of the Minister to act 
unilaterally without limitations placed upon his exercise 
of these powers in the licence itself that renders these 
clauses regulatory in effect. They are not regulatory 
in themselves, since they constitute part of a contract - 
the whole licence being agreed upon and executed by both 
parties - but in the fact that one party may thereafter 
impose conditions on, and without consent from, the other 
without provision in the contract for how these acts 
are to be done or within what limitations they are binding 
on the other party.
Clause 14 stipulates that without the consent of the 
Minister, no well may be drilled or made within 125 metres 
from any boundary of the licensed area. This provision is 
to ensure an orderly development of the various blocks by 
avoiding wasteful competitive drilling by operators of 
adjacent blocks racing to develop a common pool of oil. 
Should an oil field be across two or more licensed areas 
the Minister has power, if he considers that it is in the 
national interest in order to secure the maximum recovery 
of petroleum and in order to avoid unnecessary competitive 
drilling, to require the licensees concerned to produce 
'a development scheme* for the working and development 
of the oil field as a unit by the licensees concerned
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In cooperation^^. This is an answer to the question of 
common pools previously mentioned above. Since ownership 
of oil in situ is practically impossible to enforce, the 
law of capture has invariably been adopted. In the 
situation envisaged by clause 19 this would undoubtedly 
lead to a race between the licensees concerned, each 
striving to extract the oil through his own licensed area, 
thereby acquiring title to oil which may originally have 
lain under the other licensee’s area. It may be noted 
that the Minister will not follow the procedure of clause 19 
unless he considers ’’that it is in the national interest 
in order to secure the maximum ultimate recovery of 
petroleum” , in other words if the Minister’s view was 
that the national interest was not affected, or indeed 
that to allow competitive drilling to take place would 
increase the total recovery of petroleum, even if that 
severely prejudiced one licensee, he could not require a 
development scheme for unit development of the field.
There is not even anything in clause 19 to compel the 
Minister to require such a scheme even if the conditions 
for doing so do exist - he is authorised, not obligated, 
to do so. Thus this clause cannot act as a method of 
settling questions of common pools unless first, it is 
in the national interest to do so and secondly, the 
Minister decides to act accordingly.
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The licensee is bound to ensure that all petroleum 
won and saved from the licensed area is delivered on 
shore in the United Kingdom, except for that consumed in 
drilling, production or pumping operations, unless the 
Minister agrees to the contrary, which agreement may 
contain conditions such as to the place of delivery, 
the price, or time of d e l i v e r y , S e c u r i t y  of supplies 
of oil has always been one of the cornerstones of British 
oil policy, dating back to our oil burning warships in 
the First World W a r . T h i s  concern has been increased by 
more recent events which have demonstrated the vulnerability 
of states relying heavily on imported oil, such as the 
turning off of the oil taps by Iran following the 
Revolution in January 1979, and the numerous price 
escalations made possible by the united strength of the 
middle eastern oil exporting states. This provision as 
to delivery gives the U.K. Government potential possession 
of all oil produced in the North Sea should it so require, 
either in the interests of national security if other 
supplies were at risk, or to ensure its revenue from 
companies operating in the North Sea, in the event of an 
oil company refusing to pay money owed to public 
authorities, most likely the Inland Revenue. It is also 
a useful devise for the Minister to have power to impose 
conditions such as to the place of delivery^^, the price^^,
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59time and manner of payment and that payment must be 
made to a United Kingdom resident^^ so that he may, if 
necessary, carry out his Government’s policy despite 
having permitted oil companies to carry out their business 
with a degree of independence from governmental control, 
in order to facilitate trading efficiency.
Clause 22 requires the licensee to keep records 
of its activities in the licensed area, including the 
results of drilling operations, which the Minister has 
power to inspect. Clause 23 requires the licensee to 
make detailed monthly returns to the Minister of each 
well drilled, the kind of work done, the petroleum, 
water, mines or workable seams of coal encountered and 
the amount of petroleum won and saved in the licensed 
area. The licensee must keep samples of any petroleum 
and water discovered in the licensed area^^, which the 
Minister may inspect and analyse. The Minister may 
authorise persons to enter into and upon the licensee’s 
installations or equipment to examine the same and to 
install any equipment which the Minister is entitled to 
install to check on the licensee’s operations.
These last few provisions, stated briefly, 
demonstrate the degree of control which the Government, 
through the Minister, retained in relation to the 
exploitation of the North Sea. It is entitled to full
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records of the technical and financial activities of the 
licensees in the North Sea, has power to ensure that the 
information it is given is accurate through inspection, 
and ultimately, control of the oil produced if such 
control proved necessary. These powers, although written 
into the licence, have the appearance of regulation rather 
than agreement. They are not unlike the general powers of 
the Inland Revenue to enter premises, call and search for 
documents, etc. , but are even more extensive in that 
the Minister may invoke them entirely at his discretion; 
for example, he need not have any reasonable grounds to 
suspect a criminal offence has been committed to enter 
the licensee’s property and carry out inspections^^, as 
the revenue authorities would have to have to act in such 
a manner. The Minister may, in certain circumstances, 
even execute works necessary to ensure that licensees 
comply with specified terms of the licence^^.
In the event of a licensee failing to pay any of 
the considerations payable in terms of the licence, clause 
29 gives the Minister the right of distress, or summary 
diligence as it applies to Scotland, against the licensee. 
This is specified to be exercisable ”in like manner as 
a landlord” and indeed is not unlike the consent to 
registration for execution which one is accustomed to 
seeing in deeds, such as Standard Securities or leases.
in domestic Scottish contracts. The alternative clause 29 
for licensed areas in, or waters adjacent to, Scotland, 
or areas in respect of which an order in Council has 
been made making provision for the determination of 
questions in accordance with the law in force in Scotland 
serves as a reminder that two different legal systems 
may have cause to construe such licenses, therefore 
licenses have to be framed in such a way as to receive 
the same effect in either Scotland or England.
The licensee may not, without the consent in writing 
of the Minister, assign or part with any of the rights 
conferred by the l i c e n c e . I t  is natural that the Minister, 
having gone to considerable trouble to select suitable 
licensees, should not allow them to transfer the licence 
to any other company or individual of their choice, 
particularly since a licensee wishing to sell its licence 
would be applying different principles in choosing a 
purchaser from the principles adopted by the Minister, the 
former being primarily concerned with profit, the latter 
with broader considerations such as the national interest, 
the orderly development of oil and gas resources, the 
financial standing and technical expertise of the licensee, 
the licensee’s past record and so on.
As is often the case in domestic leasing, provision 
is made for the landlord (the Minister) to terminate the 
lease (licence) if the tenant (licensee) breaches any 
material condition t h e r e o f . T h i s  would be a drastic 
remedy appropriate only for the most serious breaches, 
since it would involve an absolute termination of the 
licensee's rights in the licensed area, with no contractual 
right to compensation for work already done there or 
money spent in the expectation of future profits. On 
considering the huge investment - hundreds of millions of 
pounds - which may be made in a field before any oil is 
produced, it is apparent that the Minister would be very 
reluctant to revoke a licence for anything short of 
complete non-cooperation from a licensee, which would be 
such a foolhardy practice that no oil company is likely 
to indulge in it.
The final clause of the licence^^ provides for 
arbitration to settle any dispute or difference arising 
between the Minister and the licensee arising under or by 
virtue of the licence except such matters as the licence 
stipulates are to be determined by the Minister. The 
appointment of such arbiter, and the arbitration itself, 
are governed by the law of England, Scotland or Northern
Ireland, as the case may be. Again it can be seen that 
different legal systems may govern individual licences, 
and different interpretations may arise as a result.
This is unlikely to be a major problem however, since 
the U.K. legal systems do not diverge greatly in most 
areas of company law and contract and all would be 
dealing with the same material in the Regulations. The 
real significance of this clause lies not in the fact that 
there are different domestic legal systems, but that it is 
domestic law, rather than international law, which is stated 
to govern the arbitration proceedings.
THE CHANGE OF POLICY
These Regulations and model clauses were effective 
for the first four rounds of offshore licensing, but 
changes in policy began to be discussed seriously at 
the time of the General Election in 1974. The Labour 
Party's policy was thus expressed: "Labour's determination 
to ensure not only that the North Sea and Celtic Sea oil 
and gas resources are in full public ownership, but 
that the operation of getting and distributing them is 
under full Government control with majority public 
participation.
Having won the election, the Labour Party published 
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a White Paper which laid down the details of the policy 
of the Government, which were followed through into the 
Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, There were 
new proposals to help Scotland and Wales, and proposals 
to amend the corporation tax legislation but the main 
policy innovations were fivefold: first, to impose an
additional tax on the oil companies; secondly, to 
require State participation in all future licences when 
the Government so wished; thirdly, to achieve "voluntary" 
participation with respect to already existing licences; 
fourthly, to set up a British National Oil Corporation, 
through which the Government was to exercise its 
participation rights and which would build up a powerful 
and expert supervisory staff and fifthly, to extend the 
Government's powers to control physical production and 
pipelines, including control of the rate of depletion, 
and to take royalty payments in kind. By these means 
the Government intended to make "the sort of provisions 
that should have been made before the fourth licensing 
round"^^, i.e. by the previous Conservative government.
The provisions introduced in implement of these aims may 
now be looked at in the light of the foregoing analysis 
of the position up to and including the fourth licensing 
round.
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The changes made by the Government of this time
fall into two distinct categories: first, those made
by the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975 ("The
1975 Act") and the Oil Taxation Act, 19 75, and secondly,
those made for the Fifth Round by the Petroleum (Production)
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Regulations 1976 ("The 1976 Regulations"). The significance 
of the distinction lies in the fact that the 1976 Regulations 
were laid down to govern future licences to be awarded 
in the fifth and subsequent rounds. If the oil companies 
perceived them as being unfair, they were under no 
obligation to apply for further licences and could simply 
ignore them. The 1975 Act also laid down new regulations, 
but did so by amending the 1966 Regulations which meant that 
the conditions of existing licences were altered retro­
spectively by the Government. The significance in this 
distinction lies not in the retroactivity of the 1975 Act 
itself but in that the 1975 Act was a purported unilateral 
amendment of an agreement in the nature of a contract.
The latter phrase, "in the nature of a contract", is 
important since the legality or illegality of the 1975 Act, 
under International Law, hinges upon the legal nature of 
the production licence. If the licence is of the nature 
of what is generally thought of as a licence in the 
United Kingdom, a standard administrative method of
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regulating individual exemptions from legislative
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prohibitions (such as television , driving , betting 
s h o p s p u b l i c  houses or c l u b s t h e n  it can undoubtedly 
be amended as the Government may amend most national 
laws. If, however, the licence is in the nature of a 
contract, the contracting parties (here the Government 
and the oil company) acquire vested rights which cannot 
be altered other than by mutual consent. On the nature 
of these licences, Daintith and Willoughby^^ say "it is 
not surprising, therefore, that the licences should be 
contractual in form and should display certain elements of
a commercial transaction ....  at the same time the
licences contain a strongly regulatory flavour" and then 
refer to "the admixture of contractual and regulatory 
techniques represented by petroleum production licensing". 
It is essential to bear in mind the significance of the 
answer to the contractual/regulatory question when 
considering the changes made by the 1975 Act to the 
licences. (It should be noted that the 1976 Regulations 
are not subject to challenge since they are new, 
prospective regulations, which have no effect on licences 
awarded prior to the fifth round).
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THE LEGISLATIVE CHANGES OF 1975 AND THE FIFTH ROUND
The term of the licences remained unchanged by
the 1975 Act, but the 1976 Regulations changed this
provision. The current licences have an initial term of
four years, with an option on the licensee to continue
it for a further three, subject to having fully complied
77with its obligations under the licence . This provides
the Minister with an earlier chance to review compliance
by the licensee with the licence's requirements, in
particular the work programme, than under the old clause
which granted an initial period of six years. The
proposal contained in the Fifth Round Consultative
Document^^ that one-third of the licensed area be
surrendered at the end of the initial period was not
adopted in the 19 76 Regulations, presumably as a result of
the oil industry's opposition to it. Instead, two-thirds
of the licensed area requires to be surrendered at the
end of the seven year period, prior to the third term of 
79
thirty years
The 197 5 Act introduced the computation of royalty
payments into the licence i t s e l f t o g e t h e r  with
provision for payment of royalties in petroleum instead 
81
of money . There is little significance in bringing the 
amount of royalty payments from the schedules annexed to
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individual licences into the model clauses themselves 
except, if anything, to make the matter appear somewhat 
more regulatory. This is because the model clauses are 
to be incorporated in every licence unless the Minister 
sees fit to do otherwise; whereas there are no "model" 
schedules for annexation to licences, rather, each 
schedule, at least in theory, lays out terms agreed for 
each particular licence. The schedular form has much 
more of the essence of a contract, the details of which 
are agreed by the two parties, than the model clause method 
which is more susceptible of a regulatory interpretation. 
Thus this change may have been a step in the direction of 
altering the amount of royalty due but did not go so far 
itself, as it merely confirmed the rate at 12%% of the 
wellhead value of petroleum (changed to 12%% of the 
landed value of oil won and saved for the Fifth Round).
Despite this slight alteration in the status of 
the royalty payments, they are still an unusual kind of 
taxation through being specified in individual contracts 
and not laid down in general legislation to apply to 
anyone who becomes chargeable. Hence, while Parliament 
has a great deal of discretion in amending the rates or 
the structure of the country's tax system, it is not 
clear that it has power to alter the rate of royalties
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on petroleum without consent of each licensee concerned, 
on account of the nature of the payments which is at 
least partly contractual rather than fiscal.
An innovation in the 1975 Act was the power given
to the Minister to require a licensee to deliver to him
part of the petroleum won and saved in place of payment
8 2
of royalties in money . Such petroleum is called 
"royalty petroleum" and may take the form of condensate, 
natural gas and natural gas liquids, or crude oil of 
different specified qualities, or any of those indifferently, 
The shortage of oil suffered by Western states as a result 
of the OPEC Revolution of 1974 clearly demonstrated the 
wisdom of the Government guaranteeing for itself at least 
a part of the oil being produced within the country, which 
may be required for the operation of essential services 
during an oil shortage or the replenishing of reserves 
in anticipation of or after a shortage. It may also be 
financially preferable for the Government to require oil 
rather than its landed value at a certain time.
The wisdom of this measure does not alter the 
fact that its introduction was a unilateral alteration of 
the licences already granted to the oil companies. It 
would have been unobjectionable for Parliament to 
legislate in general terms that debts owed to the Treasury
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could, if so required, be recovered, not in sterling,
but in petroleum, and thereafter apply the provision in
practice only to royalties in respect of oil recovered,
since this would form part of the general law of the
land from which nobody within the jurisdiction of the
U.K. courts would be immune. It is objectionable,
however, for Parliament to import this additional condition
into pre-existing licences of the nature of offshore
production licences which have this substantial contractual
element which gives rise to vested or acquired rights,
which may not be altered or reduced except by mutual
8 3
agreement of all parties . The Government by adding 
this provision to licences interfered with the rights of 
the licensees, as stated in each licence. It should be 
noted that the same result could have been achieved by 
the statutory creation of a right in favour of the 
Government to require a percentage of oil landed to be 
handed over to it, with a corresponding obligation upon 
the Government to refund an equivalent amount of royalty 
payment received from the licensee from whom the oil was 
required. This would amount to expropriation of such 
oil, but as long as it was applied in a non-discriminatory 
fashion and upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation (by returning or waiving royalty payments) 
it would be acceptable under international law^^. This
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would be a more complex method of achieving the desired 
result, and certainly much less politically acceptable, 
but would have avoided the legal problems of unilaterally 
introducing new conditions into a contractual arrangement.
As with the royalty payments, the 197 5 Act replaced 
a reference to a schedule with detailed provisions in 
respect of the working obligations of the licensee. The 
substantive obligations remain in schedular form but the 
procedures for submission of appropriate programmes by 
licensees, approval by the Minister, obtaining consents 
and so on are set out in the licence i t s e l f S o  the 
Minister can now, during the second (or since 1976, the 
second or third) term of the grant, require the licensee 
to submit an appropriate programme for exploration of 
the licence area. This may involve the holder of a 
licence granted prior to 1975 being required to submit 
and then carry out work programmes not envisaged at the 
time of the Initial grant of his licence.
Among the provisions introduced in this section of 
the 1975 Act were limitation notices, which may be served 
by the Minister and which permit the Minister to issue 
further notices varying for a specified period the 
maximum or minimum quantities of petroleum indicated in 
the licensee's p r o g r a m m e . T h u s  any development and 
production programme may be modified to require a slower.
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or a faster rate of production under certain circumstances,
although this is mitigated in practice by the assurance
made at the Committee stage of the 1975 Bill^^ that effect
would be given in any limitation notice to the guidelines
8 8
already laid down by the Government
Pre-1975 licensees could accordingly find themselves 
under an obligation to carry out much more onerous work 
programmes than they would desire and in some cases, at 
a time when a licensee may have reckoned that his expensive 
exploration work had been finished. Although this new 
regulation did not ipso facto modify the licensees' 
obligations, it provided the mechanism for the Minister to 
require an increased amount of exploration activity than 
laid down in the licences. This is another unilateral 
interference with the licensee's vested rights, enabling 
even greater deviations from the operation as originally 
envisaged in the agreement.
The sanction of revocation has always been present
89
in offshore production licences , as in most other types
of licence, but it was amended by the 19 75 Act to allow
the Minister to revoke licences, in certain circumstances,
90with respect to a part only of the licensed area
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This, far from being a diminished threat, may be 
a more powerful weapon than was previously available to the 
Minister. A Minister now has a penalty which he may 
reasonably impose upon a licensee who is proving un­
cooperative as regards working obligations (the imposition 
of which would incidentally return some potentially 
valuable area of sea to the control of the state) as 
opposed to having only the power of total revocation, the 
use of which is virtually inconceivable due to its 
severity. This drastic remedy of total revocation is 
retained by the 1975 Act, and would prove necessary if a 
licensee were unwise enough to persist with a policy of 
non-cooperation sufficiently long to drive a Minister to 
such desperate measures; a more realistic sanction by 
far would be the gradual reduction of the licensed area 
by as many partial revocations as were required to ensure 
compliance with the terms of the licence. Any part of 
the licensed area in which the licensee is complying 
with the terms of the licence is protected from this 
sanction of partial revocation.
This innovation is a further amendment to the 
pre-existing licensee since it goes beyond the previous 
provisions and is not justified by the domestic law of 
the U.K., which contains no authority for one party to
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a contract Imposing such a penalty upon the other. In
domestic law, in the event of failure to perform a contract
amounting to a breach thereof by one party, the innocent
party's remedies would be to treat the contract as
discharged and sue for damages or to affirm the contract
91and sue for any loss sustained if he was under English
jurisdiction. The appropriate Scottish remedy would be to
sue for breach of contract with or without rescinding of 
92
the contract , It is doubtful that the partial revocation
provision of the licence would be given effect to by a
court, if contained in a domestic contract since it is
in the nature of a penalty clause - as opposed to a genuine
estimate of the loss likely to be sustained by the party
not in breach (a liquidate damages clause) and therefore 
93unenforceable . The power of revocation is closely 
analogous to the power of a landlord, often stipulated for 
in domestic leases, to terminate the lease in the event 
of a breach of any of its conditions by the tenant. The 
partial revocation provision is not encountered in 
domestic leases and as mentioned above, would be unenforce­
able in any case. This licence provision is then peculiar 
to this mode of regulation and, like the changes made to 
the royalty clauses, another example of a change from a 
highly contractual formula to a more regulatory form.
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Like the change in the statement of the working 
obligations, this amendment may not itself effect a 
practical alteration of the terms under which the licences 
are operated, but provides the procedural machinery for 
the licences to be controlled by the Minister in a way 
significantly different from that provided for in the 
original grants.
Closer supervisory control is given to the Minister
in respect of the working methods adopted by licensees.
New provisions were added on commencement and cessation
94of development wells and more detailed regulation on the
95avoidance of harmful methods of working , the most 
significant parts of which are the subsections on the 
flaring of gas. Basically a licensee must justify an 
application to flare gas extracted from a field, which 
application may then be accepted or refused by the Minister 
This was introduced when it was appreciated by the 
Government that a significant amount of gas would be lost 
through flaring, if allowed to continue unabated and 
this realisation became the more significant as the value 
of all energy sources was enhanced as a result of the 
shortage caused by the crisis of 1974. Desirable though it 
was to stop such wastage of energy resources, this was 
another condition unilaterally imposed into pre-existing 
contracts. The licensees had accepted licences which did
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not in any way restrict the common practice of flaring, 
or burning off, the gas which is released from oil fields 
along with the oil being extracted from the production 
wells; they then found themselves involved in considerable 
expenditure to save this gas, the production of which had 
hitherto not been thought a viable proposition by the 
oil companies. The desirability of such energy saving 
measures, and their public support, is undoubted, neither 
would it be denied that such provisions ought to have been 
contained in all licences, but it has never been a 
proposition of British or International Law that a condition 
generally acknowledged to be in the best interests of the 
public can be imported or introduced into contracts unless 
previous agreement has provided for such addition or 
amendment.
Another innovation of the 1975 Act was the obligation 
on the licensee to ensure that no other person exercises 
any function of an operator of the licence, without the 
Minister's consent in writing^^, provided that the Minister 
shall not refuse to give such consent if the person is 
competent (presumably in the reasonable opinion of the 
Minister) to exercise the function in question^^.
This new section, apart from excluding co-licensees 
of the operator, would appear to add nothing to the
98original provision of the 1966 Regulations which
prohibited any assignation by the licensee of any of the
rights granted by the licence. The 1975 Act retained
99the general prohibition on assignation (or "assignment" 
as it is known in English law) again adding detailed 
paragraphs on specific matters relating to the disposal of 
p e t r o l e u m . T h e s e  additional paragraphs are in fact 
an extension of the prohibition on assignment since their 
effect is to strike at agreements whereby the petroleum 
or any proceeds from its sale is assigned if, when the 
agreement is made, the petroleum has not yet been won and 
saved from the licensed area (except with the Minister's 
prior approval). Thus an agreement not amounting to an 
assignation of a right conferred by the licence is 
affected by this new clause. The right to dispose of 
petroleum won and saved is not contained in any U.K. 
production licence, which grants "EXCLUSIVE LICENCE and 
LIBERTY during the continuance of this licence^and subject 
to the provisions hereof to search and bore for, and get, 
petroleum in the sea bed and subsoil under the seaward 
area ....". The licensee's title to the oil is by virtue 
of the principle of the law of capture albeit that the 
capturing is a right conferred by the l i c e n c e . I t  is 
therefore a right arising by operation of law, and not a 
contractual one, which this clause limits. This must be 
regarded as an even greater wrong than the amendments
unilaterally imposed which amend vested contractual rights, 
since this is a purported restriction on a right of property 
conferred directly by international law itself rather than 
a breach of an agreement, which gives rise in the first 
place to domestic remedies on the secondary level of 
national law.
This provision can affect a licensee's financing
arrangements since these are often achieved by "forward
oil sales". This involves the licensee obtaining finance
for development and/or production of a field in return
for granting to the lender the right to a specified amount
of petroleum or money from the sale of petroleum when
it is won and saved. This was the method utilised by
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B.P. in financing the Forties Field. In essence the
lending banks and B.P. established a financing company
which agreed to buy the oil from B.P. as it was produced.
The banks supplied the financing company with funds, and
these were made available to B.P. by way of advance
payment for the oil to be sold by B.P. to the financing
company. As the oil is actually produced it is sold to
the financing company which requires B.P. to re-purchase
the oil, thus generating the revenue within the financing
company which it in turn pays to the banks to service
and repay the monies advanced by the banks. In the
unlikely event of the amount of the petroleum falling 
short of the necessary amount, the banks had recourse to
103B.P. itself for any balance remaining unpaid. Any
such arrangement now adopted would require the consent 
of the Minister, otherwise it would fall within the 
prohibition of clause 38.
Clause 38 is a measure to prevent avoidance of the 
requirement that all petroleum won and saved by the 
licensee be delivered on shore in the United Kingdom 
unless the Minister gives his consent to do otherwise.
This gives the government potential possession of all 
oil produced from the U.K. Continental Shelf, and thus 
a greater degree of control over activity in the North Sea 
and other oil producing areas of the U.K. sea. It would not 
defeat this objective, since the Government would not 
necessarily have to observe any forward oil sale agreement 
made by an oil company, to allow licensees to sell oil not 
yet produced, but it would present unnecessary complications 
to the Minister in the event of an emergency in which he 
desired immediate control of oil produced by the U.K. 
to discover an unexpectedly large amount of oil committed 
to financiers, often resident outside the U.K.
The original provisions on unit development or 
'unitisation* were not altered by the 1975 Act; an 
example of their operation was provided by the Frigg 
Field Reservoir Agreement 1976.^^^ The Agreement was made
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between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Norway 
to make provision for the exploration of the Frigg Field 
Reservoir, which straddles the U.K.-Norway dividing line, 
as a single unit. Such an agreement cannot itself be 
binding upon licensees in the North Sea^^^ but may be 
implemented by the issuing by the Minister of directions 
requiring the licensees to cooperate in the execution of
the Agreement if they are unwilling to do so by mutual
^107consent
The only change of significance in the total 
108
revocation provisions is the addition of the power of 
the Minister to revoke a licence if control of a licensee 
company changes and remains so changed despite notice 
by the Minister of his intention to revoke the licence 
on this account. This may be seen as replacing the former 
ground of revocation that the licensee had ceased to be 
resident in the United Kingdom or to have its central 
management and control in the United Kingdom in the 
case of a company, which disappeared when, in 1975, it 
became no longer necessary for applicants for licences to 
be citizens of or incorporated in the United Kingdom.
This requirement became illegal as regards E.E.C. residents
and companies by virtue of E.E.C, Council Directives
64/428 and 69/82^^^, but rather than extend the qualification
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to persons resident or companies incorporated within the 
E.E.C., the residence/incorporation requirement was 
dropped altogether. The Minister still has discretion 
as to which applicant is to be awarded a licence and so 
the new revocation provision is necessary to prevent 
the exercise of this discretion from being defeated by 
subsequent changes in the nature of a company.
These were the major changes effected by the 1975 
Act; which by statute, unilaterally altered the pre­
existing licence terms. The Government never admitted any 
allegation that these amendments were illegal, but some 
statements failed to rebut the charge, as evidenced 
by the following exchange in the House of Commons :-
Mr. Skeet: "is it not fair to say that in that list (of
countries which changed their oil policy) 
many of the countries have not abrogated 
the existing terms under the existing 
licences ? Why is the Minister seeking to 
do it here ?"
Mr. Varley (introducing the Second Reading of the 1975 Act 
as a bill); "Because most of those Governments had already 
made provisions, the sort of provisions that 
should have been made before the fourth 
licensing round.
It was perhaps caused by the animosity between the 
Labour and Conservative Parties of the time which resulted 
in many about-turns in policy and legislation, as 
governments lost, and then regained office, but Mr. Varley's 
theory seems to have been that the fact that previous 
governments had failed to create the kind of licensing 
conditions which the Labour Party wanted, did not prevent 
the latter subsequently imposing those conditions it 
thought desirable. The many enactments and repeals by 
consecutive governments seem to have strengthened the idea 
of parliamentary omnipotence at the expense of recognition 
that Parliament had exercised its sovereignty in creating 
vested rights which legislation could not legally alter 
or detract from, since binding contracts, and not merely 
administrative regulations, had been created.
BNOC AND PARTICIPATION
The awards of licences are governed by criteria 
laid down prior to each Licensing Round in notices in the 
London, Edinburgh and Belfast Gazettes. The legality of 
the content of those notices is not per se challengeable 
since they are purely prospective to the respective 
licensing rounds to which they relate. They intimate 
the basis of the award of licences and the expected
126.
conditions applicable to the operation of the licence 
not ascertainable from the regulations or model clauses.
Thus these notices are statements of intent, not binding 
upon the Government or the licensee, and are wholly 
superseded by the terms subsequently agreed between the 
parties to future licences. The relevance of these 
notices lies in their value as statements of Government 
policy aimed not at politicians or public opinion, but 
directly at potential licensees.
IllThe notice announcing the fourth round of licences 
specified the consideration for the licence, that applicants 
must be citizens of, or resident or incorporated in the 
United Kingdom, the procedure for applications for the 
blocks detailed, by tender for that particular round, and 
the considerations (inter alia) to be borne in mind by 
the Secretary of State in examining applications. The 
five criteria specifically laid down for the fourth round were 
(a) where a body incorporated in a country outside the 
United Kingdom holds a controlling interest in the 
applicant, the extent to which equitable reciprocal 
treatment is accorded in such other country; (b) the 
extent to which the applicant will further the thorough 
and rapid exploration of the oil and gas resources on 
the United Kingdom Continental Shelf, particular attention 
being paid to the financial and technical ability of the
127.
applicant to carry out an acceptable work programme, 
details of which to be called for when the applications 
are considered; (c) exploration work already done by or 
on behalf of the applicant which is relevant to the areas 
applied for; (d) where the applicant already holds a 
production licence(s), his previous overall performance 
and (e) the extent of the applicant's contribution, past 
or planned, to the economy of the United Kingdom.
These criteria were retained in the fifth round 
notice, but with the following additions. First, whether 
the applicant is willing to grant reasonable access to 
representatives of independent trade unions to offshore 
installations, having in mind the Government's objective 
to negotiate a memorandum of understanding on this matter. 
This merely reflects the change to a more socialist 
government since the previous round, and the opportunity 
to make a little political capital. Secondly, whether 
the applicant subscribes to the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Secretary of State and the United Kingdom 
Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) to ensure that 
full and fair opportunity is provided to U.K. industry 
to compete for orders for goods and services and the 
applicant's past performance in this respect. This 
emphasises the more nationalistic approach of the Labour 
Government of 1976 and is another condition implementing
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the policy to keep as much as possible of the oil-related 
profit within the United Kingdom.
Thirdly, and most significantly: the degree to
which the applicant, or any existing licensee in whom he 
has a controlling interest, or any existing licensee who 
has a controlling interest in the applicant, has demonstrated 
his agreement to the conceding to the state of a majority 
share in any discovery made under existing licences.
Section 1 of this notice, headed "Majority State Interest" 
states that "licences will be granted on the basis that 
the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) (or another 
state corporation), or one of its subsidiaries, is from 
the grant of the licence a co-licensee entitled to a 
51 per cent share in all the benefits of the licence".
The latter provision, not unreasonably, represented the 
practical introduction of a state enterprise into the 
operation of every licence thereafter to be granted for 
oil production on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf.
The British National Oil Corporation (BNQC) was
112created by the 1975 Act . It is not a servant or agent 
113of the Crown but has inter alia power "to do anything 
required for the purpose of giving effect to agreements 
entered into by the Secretary of State with a view to 
securing participation by the Government of the United
129.
Kingdom, or by the Corporation or any other body on 
behalf of the Government in activities connected with 
petroleum beneath controlled waters." BNOC is
dependent upon governmental approval to carry out its 
operations. For instance, it requires the Secretary of 
State's approval to search for or get petroleum outside 
Great Britain and controlled waters, to refine crude 
liquid petroleum or to treat, buy, sell or otherwise deal 
in anything derived from petroleum, to promote or 
participate in the formation of, or acquire or relinquish 
membership of or any interest in or security issued by, a 
body corporate, or to borrow or lend money, to charge 
any of its actual or future assets or to guarantee the 
performance by another person of any obligation^^^. 
Further, the Secretary of State has power to give such 
general or specific directions as he thinks fit to the 
Corporation^^^. From this, it is apparent that BNOC, 
although not formally part of the governmental structure, 
would not be able to continue its operations for any 
significant length of time without government approval.
Although the state had some involvement in offshore 
activity prior to BNOC's creation through the National 
Coal Board, the Gas Council (later the British Gas 
Corporation) and indirectly through the Government's 
shareholding in British Petroleum, a greater degree of
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participation was desired by the new Labour Government as 
it began to appear that the state might lose the profits 
of exploiting its natural resources to the oil companies^^^, 
as well as the opportunity to build up the oil industry 
in Britain, bolstering the economy and creating employment 
and expertise. Taking a greater degree of participation also 
presented a chance to adopt a generalised system of 
involvement by a custom-built oil company, rather than 
ad hoc interests taken by a coal and a gas company.
Hence BNOC was set up by the 1975 Act as a means
of ensuring participation in existing licences covering
fields which had been or would be proven commercial, and
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in all future licences . Participation, as stated, was 
made a condition of the award of licences in the licensing 
rounds subsequent to the announcement of this policy, 
and as such is unobjectionable on legal grounds. The 
clarity of the paragraph setting out this aim contrasts 
with the opaqueness of the one following, which deals 
with the more contentious matter of participation in 
existing licences, which runs as follows:-
"it is the Government's belief that majority state 
participation in the existing licences for commercial 
fields provides the best means for the nation to share 
fully in the benefits of North Sea oil without unfairness
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to the licensees since the state contributes its share 
of the costs, including past costs. Certainly this is 
the solution adopted with the consent of the oil 
companies in almost every major oil and gas producing 
country in the world, not only those in the Middle East. 
Indeed, public sector participation has worked successfully 
in the British shelf without injury to the oil companies' 
interests through the National Coal Board and British Gas - 
whose present shares will be accepted as a share in the 
total public participation. The Government hope that the 
companies will recognise the strength of their views on 
this. They want the oil companies to continue to invest 
in the North Sea on profitable terms. They will be ready 
to listen to what the companies say and consider with them 
how the common interest can best be served. They are 
sure the industry will want to submit their views at the 
earliest possible moment and to enter into talks on this
basis. The Government will be inviting them to do so
. ,,119shortly.
This was the Government's published policy; what 
followed was that participation agreements were signed 
by all North Sea licensees. They were not imposed upon 
licensees as a whole, but reached individually, and no 
formula appears to be excluded, from full participation
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In capital costs of development, to limitation of BNOC's
120rights to pre-emption of 51 per cent of the oil produced 
The doubt as to the legality of the practical implementation 
of this policy may first be perceived by contemplating 
why it was that within a relatively short period, at a 
time when many fields were beginning to justify the 
massive investment put into them, all existing licensees 
suddenly wished to renegotiate their licences to incorporate 
into them, an untried and inexperienced partner closely 
allied to the government. Renegotiation, resulting in 
genuine consensus between the relevant parties to amend 
a contract is unquestionably legally competent, but the 
exertion of undue pressure by one party upon another may 
be such as to negate the true consent of the latter, 
reducing the result to a unilateral amendment of a 
vested contractual right. The fact that the weaker party 
signs, and thereafter abides by the terms of a new 
contract does not necessarily vitiate this conclusion 
since such action may represent the minimisation of the 
party's loss - making the most of a bad situation. This 
should not disguise the fact that the change of conditions 
of contract may have been contrary to law.
There is little available documentary evidence that 
the oil companies did not voluntarily renegotiate the
J . O O  .
terms of their licences by the acceptance of BNOC as a 
C O -licensee since the negotiations were in the nature of 
private meetings relating to private contracts - even if 
the results are known in principle, the methods of 
reaching them are not disclosed. There are however many 
indications that the uneven balance of power of the two 
parties had some influence on the negotiations.
First, and purely as circumstantial evidence:
the degree of compliance with the policy statement. It
seems unlikely that no licensee, given total freedom of
choice, would have preferred to carry on without a state
partner particularly in the light of the great potential
121which, by that time, had been proven in many fields
Secondly: the fact that the granting of licences in the
fifth round was to take into account the record of
applicants in reaching agreement to conceding to the
state a majority interest in any discovery under existing 
122
licences . In other words, an oil company which had 
failed to 'voluntarily* agree on participation terms with 
the Government was unlikely to receive any more licences 
to produce oil from an area proved rich in petroleum 
deposits. This aspect is not objectionable as a condition 
of future licences, but is subject to challenge as a 
means of exerting undue pressure on existing licensees 
to introduce a partner into contractual arrangements
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which did not provide for any such change. Thirdly: 
there were statements from the government and the oil 
industry which indicated that renegotiation was not 
entered into by the full will of both parties concerned - 
that the apparent consensus reached was not entirely 
true to the facts.
An example of such a statement was made by Clifton
C. Garvin, Chairman of Exxon, who said in London, "When
the government said participation was voluntary we took
123them at their word. We are not volunteering." Despite 
this clearly stated attitude of defiance, Exxon, through 
Esso Petroleum Company Limited, had signed participation 
agreements, along with 41 other companies, as soon as 
the end of 1977^^^.
An indication of the government's approach to the 
problem of achieving participation was given by Mr. Harold 
Lever (a Cabinet Minister) in the House of Commons:-
Mr. Prost: "How can the right honourable gentleman claim
that the negotiations are voluntary when the 
Secretary of State for Energy has admitted 
that he will use his patronage to allocate 
future licences in the North Sea only to 
those who surrender participation ?"
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Mr, Lever: "With great respect to the Honourable
Gentleman, I must say that he misunderstands
the meaning of the word "voluntary". Very
few things in this life are voluntary in
the somewhat wide metaphysical sense that
it is understood by the Honourable Gentleman.
By voluntary negotiations we mean that we
have taken no legal powers and we do not feel
125
such powers will be necessary."
It is suggested that doing something for any reason short 
of the force of law is not necessarily to do it "voluntarily" 
Even if legislation was not actually required, the threat 
of it must be seen as detracting from the "voluntariness" 
of the renegotiations:
Mr. Lever: "I made it absolutely plain to the oil companies,
first that the Government would scrupulously 
honour all their contractual and commercial 
obligations. Secondly, I made clear that if 
they did not feel able to participate on 
the terms I outlined, or if they preferred 
not to participate at all, I have no statutory 
powers. I had to tell them that it was very 
possible that if they did not feel free to 
participate, the Cabinet would be free
IJD .
(interruption) feel obliged, if it were
unable to satisfy its objectives, which seem
to us fair and reasonable and not incompatible
with the interests of the oil companies, by
voluntary agreement with them to nationalise
that proportion of the licences that it
127thought right to nationalise."
Thus there were open threats of legislation, going as 
far as nationalisation of oil interests, if "voluntary" 
agreements were not reached. Licensees were therefore 
left little choice but to offer participation deals to 
BNOC, since they would be unlikely to receive further 
licences if they failed to do so and, if that were not 
sufficient compulsion, it was strongly indicated that 
participation would be achieved by legislation, which may 
have been much less favourable than negotiated terms, even 
if negotiations were conducted under some duress.
The conclusion drawn from this is that, as regards 
BNOC, the Government did not lay down in writing, whether 
in consultative documents, Gazette notices, legislation 
or otherwise, anything which is per se illegal under 
International Law, particularly since nothing with any 
compulsion attached had retroactive effect. The action 
of the Government in introducing BNOC into licences
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awarded prior to 1975 was subject to challenge by the 
oil companies because it amounted to a unilateral 
alteration of the vested rights of the licensees created 
by those licences by the use of undue pressure including 
the threat of no further licence and the threat of 
partial expropriation. Two points should be noted as 
regards these unlawful amendments.
First, they were not, unlike the statutory changes 
in the model clauses discussed earlier, laid down by force 
of law which would have made their illegality all the 
clearer, but rather they were achieved by renegotiation, 
the "voluntariness" of which was emphasised by the 
Government, unless voluntariness flagged, in which case 
the alternatives were emphasised.
Secondly, there was no public outcry or litigation, 
on the part of the oil companies. The nature of the 
pressure applied upon them by the Government was such 
that, having recognised that the Government's policy 
could not be changed and that legislation would be 
introduced if necessary, the oil companies saw that their 
best approach was to enter negotiations and try to 
achieve the best deal possible in the circumstances. The 
vast investment already put into the North Sea and the 
remarkable rise in potential profits due to the OPEC
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Revolution had effectively rendered withdrawal from the 
North Sea unthinkable at that time, which must have been 
a factor of which the Government was well aware when 
presenting its new terms to the licensees,
TAXATION OF OIL REVENUES
For the period up until the North Sea began to appear
as an important source of natural resources (and revenue),
companies operating there were treated no differently from
any other company for tax purposes. Basically this meant
that companies resident in the U.K. were subject to
Corporation Tax on their total profits including capital
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gains, irrespective of where they arose and non-resident
companies carrying on a trade in the U.K. on profits arising
129through that branch or agency . The only qualification 
to the general statement is that licensees were obliged 
to pay the 12%% royalty due in terms of their licences, 
but this is more in the nature of a contractual provision 
than a true tax since it is not laid down by Public 
General Statute but rather in individual agreements. For 
this reason royalties will not be discussed per se in 
this section on taxation.
Oil companies and profits derived from oil were 
not then regarded as special cases by the revenue authorities
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prior to 1973. The Finance Act 1973 was the first
significant modification to this approach. The effect
130of the provisions of this Act was to extend the 
definition of the U.K. for most tax purposes to include 
U.K. territorial waters as far as the three mile limit 
and to bring within the charge to Corporation Tax "any 
profits or gains from exploration or exploitation activities" 
accruing to a non-U.K. resident as if it were a profit or 
gain arising in the U.K. through a branch or agency. Thus 
all profits deriving from the U,K. Continental Shelf would 
be subject to U.K. taxation, irrespective of the nationality 
or residence of the company concerned (subject of course to 
the application of any relevant double-taxation Treaty).
This extension was not prejudicial to companies 
involved in the oil business, but merely a response to a 
new situation i.e. that due to new technology, profits 
could be made within an area to which the U.K. had 
exclusive rights which had previously not been capable 
of exploitation and hence had never been considered 
seriously enough to trouble bringing within the general 
scope of Corporation Tax. This legislation did not put 
companies working in the North Sea in a worse position 
than others operating in the U.K. but rather put them on 
an equal footing by closing gaps which may have permitted 
certain parties to avoid U.K. taxation.
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Subsequent changes in corporate taxation did, 
however, strike at oil companies in a way in which no 
other companies were legislated against. The most 
important enactment in this respect was the Oil Taxation 
Act 1975 which created a new and separate oil taxation 
regime (at more or less the same time as the Petroleum and 
Submarine Pipelines Act 19 75 restructured the licensing 
system for oil exploitation). The preamble to the Oil 
Taxation Act 1975 states that it is "An Act to impose a 
new tax in respect of profits from substances won or 
capable of being won under the authority of licences 
granted under the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 or the 
Petroleum (Production) Act (Northern Ireland) 1964; to 
make in the law relating to income tax and corporation 
tax amendments connected with such substances or with 
petroleum companies; and for connected purposes."
CORPORATION TAX
As mentioned above, Corporation Tax is the general
system by which the U.K. taxes companies based or operating
within its territorial jurisdiction, and as such is dealt
131with in detail in many textbooks. The purpose of
this study is not to narrate in any detail the statutory 
provisions on Corporation Tax or their effect, but to look 
at the international legal validity of its specialties as
141.
regards the oil industry.
Every company subject to U.K. taxation is required
to file with the Inland Revenue an annual statement of 
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taxable income . This normally takes the form of its 
audited statutory accounts together with a schedule of 
adjustments. These adjustments add back items such as 
depreciation, normally deducted from gross profits for 
accounting purposes which are not allowable deductions as 
such for tax purposes, and deduct tax-allowable items such 
as capital allowances such as industrial buildings 
allowances, regional development grants, tax already paid 
as advance corporation tax, and allowable interest payments. 
Once an adjusted profit (or loss) has been computed, 
corporation tax is currently payable thereon at the rate 
of 52%, subject to reduced and marginal rates for small 
companies.
The major differences in the application of this 
scheme to the oil companies are in two areas: the valuation
of the gross profit figure, and the principle known as 
"the Ring Fence".
Valuation
One of the most important powers of the Inland 
Revenue is the power to look behind an inter-company 
transaction to examine whether the relative accounting
.entries in the books of the companies concerned give a 
true view of the nature of the transaction. "Where any 
property is sold and (a) the buyer is a body of persons 
over whom the seller has control, or the seller is a body 
of persons over whom the buyer has control, or both the 
seller and the buyer are bodies of persons and some other 
person has control over both of them; and (b) the property 
is sold at a price less than the price which it might have 
been expected to fetch if the parties to the transaction 
had been independent persons dealing at arms length, then, 
in computing the income, profits or losses of the seller 
for tax purposes, the like consequences shall ensue as 
would have ensued if the property had been sold for the 
price which it would have fetched if the transaction had
been a transaction between independent persons dealing as
- iil34aforesaid.
This prevents companies from determining in which 
section of an organisation comprising several associated 
companies profits are to be shown in the accounts, hence 
preventing companies avoiding U.K. taxation by showing 
little or no profits made in the U.K. by transferring these 
earnings (on paper) to associated companies outwith the 
scope of U.K. taxes. Section 485 ensures that profits 
cannot, by pure accounting methods, avoid attracting tax 
where they were actually earned. The proviso to this
14J .
substitution of arm's length prices is, broadly speaking, 
where the buyer and the seller are both U.K. resident trading 
companies.
This section is tightened up in its application to 
"petroleum companies" by Schedule 9 to the Oil Taxation Act 
1975. A "petroleum company" is defined as a company 
carrying on any of the following activities
(a) the acquisition or disposal of petroleum or of rights
135to acquire or dispose of petroleum ;
(b) the importation into or exportation from the United 
Kingdom of petroleum products or the acquisition or
disposal of rights to such importation or exportation
(c) the acquisition otherwise than for importation into
the United Kingdom of petroleum products outside the
United Kingdom or the disposal outside the United
Kingdom of petroleum products not exported from the
137United Kingdom by the company making the disposal ;
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(d) the refining or processing of crude petroleum ;
(e) the extraction of petroleum, either under rights
authorising it or under contractual or other




(f) the ownership, operation or management of ships
or pipelines^^^ used for transporting or conveying
141petroleum or petroleum products
A company is also a petroleum company if it is associated 
with a company whose activities include those above 
described and whose own activities include the ownership, 
operation and management of ships or pipelines used for 
transporting or conveying petroleum or petroleum products
The first major extension of the Revenue's powers 
with regard to this section is in the situation where a U.K. 
resident petroleum company is a buyer or seller. Then the 
U.K. resident buyer or seller proviso to s485 is nullified 
where : -
(a) either party to the transaction is a petroleum 
company or both are petroleum companies, and
(b) the activities of either or both are to include 
activities satisfying the following conditions
(i) that profits of the activities are or would be 
subject to overseas tax qualifying for double- 
taxation relief in the U.K.; or
(ii) that the activities are exploration or 
exploitation activities within the meanings of 
Section 38 of the Finance Act 1973, and
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(c) the transaction is part of such activities or is
connected with them^^^.
The effect of this extension is to allow the Revenue 
to impose arm's length prices upon a transaction involving 
two U.K. resident affiliated companies where the above 
conditions are fulfilled. This extension was made because 
by using two U.K. resident companies, a group involving 
petroleum companies could put the whole group profit into 
the one of the group - by appropriate use of transfer 
pricing - which would also be making payments of tax due 
in foreign states on account of foreign operations. These 
tax payments to the foreign state would be covered by 
credit in the U.K. for foreign tax, hence restricting or 
avoiding altogether the group's liability to U.K. tax^^^.
By imposing market-values upon inter-company transactions, 
transfer pricing (i.e. pricing at under-value) cannot be 
used to shift the profits for tax purposes of a group of 
companies from the member or members of the group actually 
producing the profits to any other company or companies 
in the group. This extension was an anti-avoidance provision, 
and it may be argued that a similar restriction would be 
imposed upon any other sphere of commerce which began 
utilising transfer pricing to avoid U.K. taxation to the 
extent that oil companies were alleged to have done.
Like the territorial extension of U.K. taxation discussed 
above, this may be seen as a measure to prevent the oil 
industry securing undeserved taxation advantages by the 
nature of its international business, rather than as a 
measure discriminating against foreign companies which would 
be challengeable under international l a w . T h i s  view 
is further supported by the fact that the extension of 
the ordinary taxation provisions applies where two U.K. 
resident affiliate traders are concerned, and cannot 
therefore be said to discriminate in any way against 
foreign nationals.
The second extension of the Revenue's power to 
impose arm's length prices arose because it was thought that 
the oil industry was diverting profits out of the U.K. by 
means of a series of linked transactions world-wide, which 
would not necessarily be caught by the common-control , 
proviso of s485. It was enacted that the arm's length 
rules can be applied without the need for common control 
where any property is sold and either the buyer or seller 
(or both) is a petroleum company, and
(a) the sale is part of a transaction or a series of 
transactions (whether or not between the same 
persons) and its terms are affected by those of 
the remainder of the transaction or transactions; or
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(b) what is sold is petroleum extracted under rights 
exercisable by a company other than the buyer and 
not less than 20% of that company's ordinary share 
capital is owned at the time of the sale directly 
or indirectly by the buyer or a company associated 
with the buyer^^^.
Although this also represented a departure from the 
normal taxation provisions, it cannot be attacked as being 
discriminatory since it is an anti-avoidance provision 
directed at all petroleum companies which may have been 
attempting to avoid U.K. taxation by means of elaborate 
schemes of linked transactions. It does not extend the 
tax system but merely closes a gap in an existing scheme.
These measures on valuation of transactions are all 
legitimate anti-avoidance provisions, merely preventing 
the oil industry from using its very nature to avoid payment 
of the amount of taxation to which it would be liable under 
the general scheme of U.K. corporate taxation. They do 
not penalise the oil industry but merely ensure that it 
bears an equal share of the burden of taxation.
The Ring Fence.
The ring fence principle was introduced by the Oil 
Taxation Act 1975 as a means of ensuring that the 
corporation tax arising on profits made by oil companies
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in the U.K. is not diluted by any other activities of the 
companies involved. Its effect is to isolate profits 
from 'oil extraction activities' in the U.K. or on the 
U.K. continental shelf and profits attaching to 'oil rights', 
from other activities of the company or group of companies, 
for the purpose of assessing corporation tax. It acts 
like a valve, preventing loss relief from flowing into 
ring fenced activities from outside, whilst permitting 
reliefs arising within a ring fence to be applied outwith
it. Any oil crossing the fence is valued at full market
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For corporation tax, losses and capital allowances 
can normally be dealt with by (a) carrying them forward 
to set against future profits of the same trade^^^, (b) 
relieving them against profits of any kind of the same company 
arising in the same or previous accounting periods and/or^^^
(c) relief against the profits of any company or companies 
in the same group arising in the same accounting period^^^.
The ring fence principle permits only losses arising from 
oil extraction activities and the acquisition, enjoyment or 
exploitation of oil rights to be set against profits arising 
therefrom^^^.
Ring fence oil extraction activities broadly cover 
the following types of operations in the U.K. or on the 
U.K. continental shelf: (a) searching for oil, (b) extracting
oil, (c) transporting oil extracted offshore to dry land
in the U.K., and (d) initial treatment and storage of oil 
152won. The other ring fence activities are those relating
to the acquisition, enjoyment or exploitation of 'oil 
rights' which are defined as rights to oil to be extracted 
in the U.K. or a designated area of the U.K. continental
153shelf or the interests in or to the benefit of such oil.
These ring fence activities are treated as a 
separate trade from any other which a company may carry on 
and separate accounts have to be prepared of income and 
expenditure relating to these activities for a separate 
computation of corporation tax to be made.
The existence of ring fence activities brings into 
effect the special provisions relating to profits and losses 
within, and in particular cases, across the ring fence, but 
the details of these arrangements will not be discussed in 
this study since they are primarily the concern of the oil 
companies' taxation advisers. The important legal issue 
is the isolation of one activity for the purpose of 
taxation.
The potentially challengeable aspects of such treatment 
of an industry are that it amounted to creeping expropriation 
or that it discriminated against foreign companies.
Taxation of companies by its nature, involves no 
direct quid pro quo, and would therefore be an illegal means 
of expropriation since it would not involve any element of 
compensation which is a requisite of legal expropriation.
It is submitted, however, that nothing in these corporation 
tax changes was unduly onerous or sufficiently outwith the 
general scheme of the tax so as to amount to expropriation. 
Further, the ring fence principle as applied to corporation 
tax does not adversely affect foreign companies to any 
greater extent than U.K. companies. Indeed the reverse is 
likely to be the case, since a U.K. company is more likely 
than a foreign company to have loss reliefs recognised for 
U.K. corporation tax which it would be able to set against 
its oil-related profits if it were not for the ring fence 
principle.
There is, then, no corporation tax provision 
sufficiently penalising to amount to expropriation, creeping 
or otherwise, and those measures aimed directly at the oil 
industry are more objectionable to U.K. companies than 
foreign investors. No amendments to the corporation tax 
legislation therefore exceed the sovereign authority of a 
state to tax those within its jurisdiction by amounting 
to discrimination or confiscation and cannot therefore be 
challenged by International Law.
Petroleum Revenue Tax.
Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) was introduced by Part I
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concept in U.K. taxation. It operates separately from the 
main body of U.K. corporate taxation and utilises quite 
different p r i n c i p l e s . PRT is levied on profits from 
oil (which term includes natural gas) won under the authority 
of licences granted under the various enabling provisions.
It would be inappropriate to discuss the detailed
157provisions of PRT at length here , but an explanation of 
the basic principles is necessary.
PRT is payable (initially at 45%, then successively 
at 60%^^^ and 70%^^^) on assessable profits accruing to 
participators after 12th November 1974, and is assessed 
field by field on the basis of half-yearly periods ending 
on 30th June and 31st December in each year after the 
critical half year^^^. The critical half year is the first 
half year ending after 12th November 1974 at the end of which
the total oil won and saved from the field exceeded 1,000
1  ^ 161 long tons
Separate returns must be made of income and expenditure 
(no distinction being made between capital and revenue 
expenditures) for each field for the assessment of PRT.
These must be made within one month of the end of the 
chargeable period^^^ by the * responsible person* who will 
have been nominated for each field by the participators or
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the Inland Revenue , More detailed returns must be made 
by the participators themselves within two months of the 
end of the chargeable period^^^. Any relevant claims 
having been made by the participators and responsible 
persons for expenditure and losses, the Inland Revenue 
makes its assessment three months after the end of the 
period^^^ and PRT is payable four months after the end 
of the period^^^.
It can be seen that a great deal of the administrative 
burden of PRT falls upon the taxpayers who require to 
prepare these detailed returns twice in each year for each 
field in which they have an interest - a much greater 
workload than any other tax involves on the part of the 
taxpayer.
The assessment is computed by taking the sum of
certain 'positive amounts' and ' negative amounts', the
difference between the two resulting in either an assessable
profit or an allowable loss^^^. Any PRT payable is
deductible in computing income for corporation tax purposes.
The positive amounts are gross profit, licence credits and
the amount credited in respect of expenditure^^^; the
negative amounts are gross loss, licence debit and the
169amount debited in respect of expenditure
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The rules for determining gross profit are much 
more restrictive than for corporation tax. In particular, 
for actual sale proceeds to be accepted, the transaction 
must be 'at arm's length* which is narrowly defined for 
PRT as being a contract where:
(i) The contract price is the sole consideration for the 
sale, and
(ii) the terms of the sale are not affected by any 
commercial relationship (other than that created 
by the contract itself) between the buyer and the 
seller or persons connected with the buyer or the 
seller, and
(iii) neither the seller nor a connected person has any 
interest, direct or indirect, in the subsequent 
resale or disposal of the oil or any product 
derived therefrom .
If these stringent conditions are not met, the realised
price will be ignored and a market value as at the middle
171of the relevant month will be substituted
Royalty and periodic payments are included in the 
computation as licence debits or credits and will 
accordingly usually be applied in reducing the profit
1J4.
chargeable to PRT,
In addition to specific allowances such as expenditure
172 173on long term assets , abortive exploration expenditure
and otherwise unrelievable loss from an abandoned field ,
the following constitute the categories of normal expenditure
allowed for each field:-
(a) searching for oil in, and within 5,000 metres of, 
the field
(b) initial licence payments to the Secretary of State
(c) ascertaining the extent or characteristics of any 
oil bearing area wholly or partly within the field 
or the reserves thereof
(d) winning oil from the field
(e) measuring the oil won or to be won from the field
(f) transporting oil won from the field to the U.K.
(g) initial treatment or storage of oil
(h) disposing of such crude oil in arm's length sales
(i) closing down all or part of the field for reasons 
of safety or the prevention of pollution^^^.
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There are, in addition, certain special concessions 
made to participators to alleviate potential hardship 
caused by PRT,
The first is the valuable expenditure supplement
or "uplift"^^^. This is a supplement of 75% (now 35%^^^)
on to certain expenditure to replace the interest cost of
capital expenditure which would otherwise not be deductible
178
for PRT purposes , and covers substantially all development 
plan expenditure incurred before and after the field comes 
on stream.
The oil allowance was devised to encourage the
development of marginal fields. It exempts from PRT the
first 500,000 long tons of oil (or gas equivalent) from
each field in each chargeable period subject to an overall
179limit of ten million long tons per field . This allowance 
is given in respect of each field and must therefore be 
shared by the participators in accordance with their 
share of production during the relevant period.
There is an annual limit of PRT payable which does 
not constitute a deduction, but is made as a separate 
calculation and if the amount of PRT assessed should exceed 
this maximum amount, this maximum amount will be the total 
PRT payable for that calendar year. The annual limit is
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80% of the amount by which a participator's adjusted profit
(i.e. assessable profit, before reduction for losses and
oil allowance, plus expenditure qualifying for uplift) for
that year exceeds 30% of his accumulated capital expenditure
180(i.e. qualifying for supplement) at the end of that year
This safeguard is another method of assisting marginal
field development, by ensuring that a participator's return
on his investment does not fall to an unacceptably low
level on account of PRT. It should be mentioned that BNOC,
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formerly exempt from PRT , was brought within the charge
1 O  o
to PRT by the Finance (No.2) Act 1979
The main principles of PRT which set it apart from 
the general system of U.K. taxation may be summarised as 
follows :
(a) As regards expenditure, there is no distinction 
between capital and revenue;
(b) It is assessed separately on each participator for
each oil field, as determined by the appropriate 
183authority
A participator may not set losses sustained in one 
field against profits arising in another, except 
where abortive exploration expenditure has been 
incurred or where a field has permanently closed down. 
This is similar to the 'ring fence' created for
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corporation tax in respect of oil extraction and 
related activities, but much more restrictive 
since for PRT, each oil field is fenced-in, and 
subject to the above minor exceptions, nothing can 
cross the fence in either direction.
(c) The substitution of market values for actual sale
proceeds is not so much the exceptional case in 
PRT assessments, but almost the rule, due to the 
stringent test for arm's length transactions.
(d) The greatest administrative burden of PRT is placed
upon the taxpayers rather than the Inland Revenue, 
which makes PRT not only a lucrative source of 
income but also an easy tax to collect. It is 
collected half-yearly.
(e) PRT affects a very small section of the community
(although bringing in huge revenues - B.P. alone had 
a PRT liability of £781.9m in 1979^^^) and indeed is 
expressly addressed in the charging provisions to
a certain group of bodies (i.e. those having an 
interest in licences).
A state's sovereign right to impose taxes upon those 
within its jurisdiction may be restricted, under International
Law, by two principles: the rule that expropriation without
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compensation is illegal and that of pacta sunt servanda^^^
Taking of the property of aliens by means of 
increasingly harsh taxation is illegal since by its nature 
it involves no compensation - the state simply takes an 
increasingly large proportion of the benefits of a foreign 
investment without giving anything in return. For such 
measures to be illegal, they need not discriminate against 
aliens, rather they are only illegal inasmuch as they affect 
aliens since otherwise international law has no application. 
There are many foreign companies involved in oil production 
in and around the U.K.: Chevron (operator of Ninian Field),
Texaco (operator of Tartan Field), Phillips (operator of 
Maureen Field), Mobil (operator of Beryl Field) etc. 
Therefore if the legislation of 1975, involving no 
compensation and affecting these foreign nationals as it 
did, amounted to a taking of property, it was illegal.
The Harvard Draft Convention on the International
187Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens stated 
in Article 10 3(a) : -
"a 'taking of property* includes not only an outright 
taking of property but also any such unreasonable inter­
ference with the use, enjoyment or disposal of property 
as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not
159.
be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property within 
a reasonable period of time after the inception of such 
interference.”
Although not specifically mentioning creeping
18 8
expropriation by means of taxation, Professor G, C. Christie 
deals with the subject of the taking of property by means of 
creating effective monopolies. This is the situation which 
would be brought about by excessively high, discriminatory 
tax rates, especially when accompanied by a statutory 
corporation with such broad financial and regulatory 
powers as BNOC possesses. Professor Christie says:-
"The few actual cases ....  have normally involved
situations where a state has granted, or assumed itself, 
a monopoly over a particular industry. Although the damages 
in these situations are, for the sake of convenience, often 
referred to as damaged to the "good-will" of a business, 
substantial loss of value even in physical assets may be 
involved. For example some of the physical assets may be 
such as to be of no use at all in any other type of 
endeavour, or the cost of conversion to other uses may 
be too great to be practicable; and it may simply be too 
expensive to make it worthwhile to transport the equipment 
to another country.
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This type of situation could be argued to have 
been created by the U.K. Government in 1975. It created 
BNOC with a compulsory 51% interest in future licences 
and "voluntary" majority interest in existing licences, 
and power to buy, compulsorily, oil from other licensees 
at predetermined prices. Together with BNOC came PRT, 
a tax discriminating against the oil industry, and potentially 
amounting to an expropriation of oil revenues by the 
Government. This would clearly have been a "taking" had 
PRT been levied at 100%; licensees would then have been 
operating purely for the benefit of the U.K. Government 
and would have been able to claim compensation also on 
the grounds that their physical assets had been taken, 
since moving the bulk of the equipment relating to oil 
production would be almost impossible, and it would be 
useless in any other business.
Thus the legislation in 1975 was in a form which 
lent itself to a nationalisation of the oil industry in 
the U.K. It would certainly have amounted to nationalisation 
had BNOC's interests and the rate of PRT each been 100%, 
instead of 51% and 45% respectively. It was by virtue of 
these latter two percentages that licensees were permitted 
to operate with some degree of autonomy and to retain 
sufficient profit from their operations to make it 
worthwhile to continue to work in the U.K.
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The 51% participation level, and the 45% rate of 
PRT fell short of the kind of measures required to constitute
a taking or property, examples of which are contained in
190 191the Oscar Chinn case and the Savage Claim , since
these levels permitted the companies to continue operating
with a degree of independence and making large enough
profits to keep them in the North Sea. One may pause,
however, to consider whether the oil companies would not
have made much stronger appeal to international law,
complaining of expropriation, had PRT been introduced at
the present level of 70% instead of the original 45%.
Might this, coupled with the imposition of BNOC not have
come very close to a taking of property ?
The second possible ground for challenging the 
legality of PRT is the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
discussed above, A contract such as a U.K. oil production 
licence cannot restrict the capacity of Parliament to alter 
the state's general tax regime or even from raising 
corporation tax by say 30% - a measure which would certainly 
have an adverse effect on participators under production 
licences. The licence may however be seen as setting out 
the special relationship between the licensees and the 
state vis-a-vis the licensee's oil extraction activities 
inasmuch as they are not governed by the general law of
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the land. Thus there are two elements to the whole 
relationship between companies with licence interests 
(here called 'oil companies') and the state: first, the
general laws of the state, including the taxes acts (the 
general relationship), and secondly, the terms of the 
licences (the special relationship). The former remains 
within the prerogative of Parliament to alter, revoke or 
create; the latter being in the nature of a contract, 
cannot be amended except by agreement of both parties.
192The charging provisions of PRT state that it
shall be charged "in respect of profits from oil won under
the authority of a licence granted under either the
Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 or the Petroleum (Production)
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Act (Northern Ireland) 1964." Although PRT was
introduced as a part of a Public General Act, it is not 
a general tax affecting the community at large, but is 
clearly expressed to be directed only at those making 
profits through the licences. General taxes, such as 
income tax, capital transfer tax, capital gains tax and 
corporation tax are aimed at anyone making gains of 
specified kinds, in countless different ways. They are 
not directed at specific, small sections of the community 
or to particular activities or products. PRT is directed 
at one, identifiable group of persons and more specifically
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at their rewards from working with a particular product 
in strictly defined geographical areas. The "profits" 
which PRT charges need not be real, since market values 
are so readily substituted for actual prices, and losses 
from outside each ring fence are disallowed. This is a 
major distinction from the general taxes where the 
imposition of theoretical values is an unusual, anti­
avoidance measure. PRT is a means of securing a pre­
determined percentage of the value of oil produced, 
independently of the financial affairs of the companies 
concerned. For this reason PRT is better viewed as part 
of the conditions of operating a U.K. production licence, 
than as part of the general tax system. This can also be 
seen by its resemblance to the royalties payable under the 
licences. Both are directly and wholly dependent upon the 
amount of oil extracted from specified areas (the licence 
area for the royalty, the oil field for PRT) under the 
authority of the licence, by a restricted group of potential 
taxpayers.
These factors render PRT part of the special 
relationship between the oil companies and the state, since 
it is too closely connected with the oil companies' licence 
activities to be classed as part of the general law.
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The dichotomy between contract and regulation - 
licence and general law - has therefore been broken; a 
matter which, like the royalty payments, is of fundamental 
importance to the special relationship, has been imposed 
on the oil companies through the medium of the general 
relationship.
The consideration for oil companies operating their 
concessions is a contractual matter - as evidenced by the 
inclusion of the initial payments, royalty payments, etc. 
in the terms of the licences - and therefore part of the 
special relationship. The licence stands as the statement 
of that special relationship and the oil companies are 
entitled to expect that, apart from agreed changes to the 
licence, they can be affected only by changes in the 
general law. A change in the rate of corporation tax, for 
example, would constitute a legitimate change in the 
general relationship, but the introduction of a special 
tax affecting only those with interests in licences is a 
change in the special relationship, the sole measure of 
which should be the licence. The 'ring fence* around the 
licence as the measure of the special relationship was 
thus broken by the introduction of PRT, just as it was by 
the unilateral amendments to the terms of the licences 
discussed earlier. Since both the changes to the licences
165.
and the introduction of PRT amounted to breaches of state 
contracts, in the instances where those contracts involved 
a foreign national, that foreign national through its own 
national state, acquired a claim against the U.K.
Government for compensation for breach of contract.
The numerous political and economic reasons for
such claims not being espoused, not being relevant to the
legal basis of those claims, will not be examined here.
In short, it is clear that the oil companies perceived it
to be in their best interests to accept the inevitability
of a change of government policy, and to renegotiate and
liaise with the Government rather than provoke a confrontation
over strictly legal issues, which would be unlikely to
achieve any significant financial advantage, and would
certainly do irreparable damage to a relationship which the
194oil companies could ill afford to allow to deteriorate
166.
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CHAPTER V.
CONCLUSIONS
The growth in foreign investment by companies dealing 
in natural resources is seen most spectacularly in the field 
of petrochemical operations, partly because of the importance 
of oil and gas to the modern world and partly because of the 
enormous economic and political power of the oil companies.
On account of the massive investment required for oil 
production and the huge potential rewards for successful 
operations, it is a business.in which all parties concerned 
are very determined to maximise their gains. For this 
reason the strict legal position has sometimes been 
sacrificed to other, particularly commercial, considerations.
The Aramco case quite clearly affirmed in 1963 that 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda governed concession 
agreements. This principle has not always prevailed in 
practical situations because of the relative ease with which 
a state can defeat the intended meaning of concessions by 
unilateral action (such as legislation) and the great 
incentives for oil companies to compromise provided by 
(a) the substantial profits to be made even from a reduced 
share of the rewards of production, (b) the lack of means 
of enforcing judgements of international tribunals against
176.
states and (c) in some cases, the threat of complete 
nationalisation resulting in even greater losses of revenue 
if "voluntary" agreement cannot be reached.
For these reasons the law laid down by the Aramco 
case has not always been applied to subsequent concessions, 
most notably the many concessions which were affected by 
the OPEC Revolution. The oil and gas resources of the 
Middle-East are so vast that the oil companies involved in 
their exploitation could not have risked losing their 
massive investments there or their far more massive future 
profits by referring the OPEC actions to judicial determination 
and insisting upon strict application of the law without 
compromise. The OPEC nations would never have submitted 
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda which would have 
required them to accept the meagre terms of their original 
concessions and would perhaps have ousted the foreign 
oil companies altogether. As the oil companies were not 
prepared to risk everything they naturally yielded to the 
pressure and compromised with the OPEC nations to secure 
a reduced, but still substantial share of the profits of 
Middle-East production.
There has been no event or judicial pronouncement 
which has in any way diminished the authority of the Aramco 
decision. There is not even a resolution of the General
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Assembly which contradicts the Aramco principle and a 
catagorical statement would be required to alter such a 
fundamental principle of International Law as pacta sunt 
servanda. It is not sufficient that, for example,
Resolution 2158 (supra) refers to the "inalienable right" 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources with reference 
to the rule of pacta sunt servanda to infer that the rule 
has been altered, especially in the light of statements 
such as that of the U.S. spokesman (supra) which indicate 
clearly that there was not the kind of consensus of 
national wills required to create customary law, let alone 
change one of its most fundamental principles.
It has been shown that recent case law (such as 
Texaco v. Libya (supra)) has reaffirmed the principles applied 
in the Aramco case so as to dispel any doubts of its 
continuing authority.
When the actions of the U.K. Government in 1975 are 
examined in the light of the law as stated, there are clearly 
aspects which are subject to challenge as being contrary 
to international law.
The early development of the U.K. law in the field 
of oil and gas exploration and production was unexceptionable, 
being in implement of the principle of territorial 
sovereignty, as extended by the Convention on the Continental
178.
Shelf 1964.
The changes to the regime in 1975/76 were in two 
parts: first, the 1975 Act and the Oil Taxation Act 1975,
and secondly, the 1976 Regulations. The 1976 Regulations 
related only to future licences and did not affect existing 
licences in any way, and were therefore valid. As concluded 
in the previous chapter, several aspects of the 1975 
legislation are, however, illegal.
The licences granted to companies by the U.K. 
Government to produce oil and gas from the North Sea were 
negotiated individually and, upon execution, created 
contractual relationships between the licensees and the 
state, conferring vested rights upon both parties, which 
cannot be altered except by mutual agreement. The 
amendments made retrospectively and unilaterally to these 
licences by the 1975 Act (particularly in the areas of 
royalty payments, working obligations, powers of revocation 
and the prohibition of gas flaring) were therefore contrary 
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda and should be 
compensated.
The creation of BNOC and its participation in future 
licences was a valid exercise of sovereignty, but the 
introduction of BNOC as a dominant partner into existing 
licences, not being obtained by genuinely voluntary consent
of the licensees, constituted another unilateral alteration 
of the contractual basis upon which the licensees were 
operating and was a further breach of the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda.
The introduction of PRT was probably not at such a 
level as to amount to expropriation, even accompanied by 
the imposition into all licences of BNOC as a majority 
partner, and even if it could be argued to amount to 
genuine expropriation, could not be legal as such since 
it was not accompanied by compensation of any sort. The 
principle of sovereignty permits states to levy and vary 
taxes within their jurisdiction. PRT, however, was not 
part of the existing general taxation system of the U.K. 
prior to 1975, but was introduced and addressed directly 
against holders of production licences and therefore, on 
the analogy of the royalty, provisions, directly affected 
the special or contractual relationship between each 
licensee and the state. As such, it is suggested that this 
tax is subject to challenge under International Law as not 
being in reality a "tax", but rather an additional payment 
required by the government by reference to existing 
contracts (the licences), thereby unilaterally altering 
the financial terms upon which the licensee contracted 
with the state, by means of an act which could have been 
performed by only one of the parties to that contract.
thereby internationalising the contract by a wrong for 
which the foreign party is entitled to compensation.
In so far as these breaches of International Law
affected companies which were not U.K. nationals, of 
which there are many with interests in the North Sea, they 
are challengeable under International Law by the espousal 
by the national governments of the companies concerned 
of their claims.
The absence of such challenge does not detract 
from the illegality of the acts or imply acceptance of any 
derogation from the principle of pacta sunt servanda, but 
rather, demonstrates that the economic reality of the oil 
industry, first clearly shown by the OPEC Revolution, is 
that such large investments, profits and revenues are at 
stake that none of the parties involved can afford to risk 
losing out altogether, but must reach financial compromises 
at various stages irrespective of their legal rights, in
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